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This dissertation consists of two essays on surges of private and public debt flows and how these 
debt flows through financial integration affect output and consumption volatility (risk sharing) in 
emerging markets.  Chapter 1 focuses on a common characteristic of many of the recent emerging 
market financial crises – a preceding surge in the debt inflows not only in the public but also in 
the private sector. In this chapter, I examine the drivers of the occurrence and magnitude of foreign 
debt surges to 28 emerging market economies (EMEs) over 1990-2016. Using the threshold 
method of defining a surge on net external debt flows, I differentiate surges in private debt flows 
from surges in public debt flows to examine which surge flow is more sensitive to global (Push) 
factors or domestic (Pull) factors. The results suggest that global factors are the primary drivers 
for both types of debt flow surges, with global risk in particular associated with increases in public 
debt surges but decreases in private debt surges. In determining the magnitude of these surges, the 
size of public debt surges is more sensitive to the global factors than the domestic factors. 
 One benefit of financial integration according to economic theory is that it provides better 







risk sharing. Evidence from recent empirical studies on international risk sharing shows that 
external debt liabilities are associated with higher economic volatility among emerging market 
economies due to the procyclical nature of debt flowing into these countries. However, other 
studies argue that the behavior of external debt liabilities can be countercyclical or procyclical 
depending on whether the debtor or creditor is a public or private entity. The second chapter of my 
dissertation focuses on the type of debtor (public and private) and the type of creditor (public and 
private) of external debt. Using a dynamic panel model, I examine how external debt liabilities 
from these debtors and creditors affect output and consumption growth volatility among 26 
emerging economies from 1997-2016. The results suggest that i) external debt with private by a 
private borrower  tends to have insignificant effect on economic volatility ii) Public debt from 
private lenders tends to increase output volatility significantly but not  consumption volatility and 
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SURGES OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC DEBT FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS. 
 
I. Introduction 
Waves of foreign debt flows in many emerging market economies (EMEs) since the mid-
1980s has raised concerns about the impact of such flows on the macroeconomic performance of 
these economies. After falling dramatically during the 2008 global financial crisis, debt flows to 
EMEs surged in the aftermath of the crisis and then contracted sharply again in the second half of 
2011. While an integrated credit market promotes global risk sharing, higher productivity, and 
economic growth, the magnitude and volatility of debt may increase financial system 
vulnerabilities and aggravate overall macroeconomic instability 
The academic literature on waves of capital flows (including debt) has a long tradition of 
identifying the drivers (either global or domestic factors) of these flows differentiating between 
those mainly caused by changes in the country’s external liabilities and those caused by changes 
in its external assets. Several papers have examined the behavior of capital flows during “sudden 
stops” (when foreign capital decreases rapidly) and how these stops contribute to the severity of 
crises (Calvo 1998, Calvo et al 2004, Gupta et al 2007). Ghosh et al (2014) focused on surges 
(when foreign capital increases sharply) in capital flows for 56 EMEs over 1980-2011. They 
looked at the likelihood of a surge occurring and the magnitude of that surge. They further 
differentiated between surges driven by large asset flows from those of large liability flows. Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) also identified episodes of “surges” and “stops” (extreme increases and 






decreases, respectively, of gross outflows). Although this attention has been focused on what 
drives these aggregate and disaggregate capital flows, not much work has been done in identifying 
waves of private versus public debt inflows as a distinct component of such flows. Consequently, 
I focus on the debt component of capital flows and examine the characteristics and determinants 
of surges (extreme or sharp increase in net external debt inflows) to EMEs.  
Economists over the years have been very outspoken about the high risk of public 
borrowing in EMEs but have taken a more benign view on the risk of excessive private debt 
accumulation in these regions (Schularick, 2013). It is often assumed that when a private entity 
borrows, it is acting in its own interest and will bear the full consequences of its actions. This 
makes policymakers a bit lax when it comes to the issue of private borrowing. However, the fact 
that taxes have been used to bail out private entities caught in a debt overhang that need to 
deleverage means private debt should be equally concerning to researchers as public debt. An 
example is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (bank bailout 2008) proposed by 
the then US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson to purchase up to $700 billion worth of mortgage-
backed securities from banks (private investors who took risk to earn profit at taxpayers’ expense). 
Although the proposal of this act was met with massive public disapproval including prominent 
economists penning a letter to the US Congress to question the “fairness” of the planned bailout1, 
this act was still signed into law by President George W. Bush in October 2008. Globally, this act 
of government intervention to support failing private entities creates a situation where excess 
private debt invariably leads to higher public debt once there is deleveraging in the private sector. 
Jorda et al. (2013) argue that the risks of financial instability historically emanated from the private 
 








sector. Consequently, my analysis focuses on the surges in both private debt (debt issued by private 
entities like private banks or bonds that are privately placed) and public debt (debt issued by a 
government or international organizations like the IMF, World Bank etc.). My main focus is the 
factors that determine the likelihood of these surges in private and public debt flows, examining 
both supply-push and demand-pull factors.  After identifying the surges, I also calculate the 
magnitude of the surges.  
I use debt data from International Debt Statistics of the World Bank’s Global Development 
Finance (GDF) database that covers 28 emerging market economies (EMEs) over 1990-2016. To 
examine the drivers of occurrence and magnitude of foreign debt surges, I use the threshold method 
to define a surge on net external debt flows, differentiating surges of private debt flows from public 
debt flows. I focus on global factors such as global risk aversion, global interest rates, and global 
economic growth rates that are thought to push capital into a country.  I also examine domestic 
factors such as a country’s current account balance, international reserves, real GDP per capita, 
financial openness (measured by KAOPEN), the level of a country’s domestic credit, and 
institutional quality that are thought to pull capital into a country. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as followed:  In section II, I discuss the determinants 
of debt flows, including global factors and domestic factors. Section III introduces the 
methodology to identify the types of debt surge and describes how I measure the occurrence and 
magnitude of these debt surges. Section IV discusses the data used with results in Section V. I 









II. Determinants of Capital (debt) Flows 
In this section, I discuss the literature on global and local factors that determine private 
versus public led episodes of extreme debt flows. To examine both global “push” factors and 
domestic “pull” factors as the determinants of debt flow episodes to recipient EMEs, I first explain 
how these factors have influenced both the movement of international capital flows and extreme 
episodes of capital flows in other studies. I then explain how I expect these factors to affect the 
two types of debt flows considered here: private and public debt flows.  
 Global factors are the external factors that induce investors, whether foreign or local, to 
increase their financial investment or exposure to the local country.  These factors are largely 
beyond the control of the domestic countries. The idea of push factors stems from the neoclassical 
theory, which predicts that capital flows react to interest rate differentials between countries and 
that capital flows from countries with low expected returns to those with high expected returns. 
The pull factors, on the other hand, are country specific characteristics such as macroeconomic 
fundamentals, government policies, and market imperfections that affect the investment decisions 
of both local and foreign investors (Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 1996). Seminal papers that 
examined drivers of capital flows include Chuhan et al. (1993), Griffin et al. (2004), and Fratzscher 
(2011), which show that both global and domestic factors are equally important while Calvo et al. 
(1993, 1996), Fernandez-Arias (1996), and Chuhan et al. (1998) find that global  factors are more 
important than domestic fundamentals in driving capital flows.  
The dynamics and factors that drive extreme episodes in capital flow movement may be 
quite different from the normal flows, but existing empirical evidence is limited. A few available 
studies that have looked at episodes of extreme capital flow movement either in its aggregate or 






and Ghosh et al.  (2014). Forbes and Warnock (2012) identified episodes of “surges” and “stops” 
(sudden increases and decreases, respectively of gross capital inflows) and “flight” and 
“retrenchment” (sudden increases and decreases, respectively, of gross capital outflows). They 
find that global factors, particularly global risk and global growth in real economic activity, are 
responsible for the extreme capital flow episodes. Forbes and Warnock (2014) later extended the 
analysis in Forbes and Warnock (2012) where they examined which type of capital flows are 
driving the episodes, focusing on debt flows versus equity flows. Their results show that most of 
these extreme capital flows are debt led. That is, 80% of episodes of extreme changes in capital 
inflows (driven by nonresidents) are mainly from changes in debt flows.  Ghosh et al. (2014) 
suggest that although both global and domestic factors drive surges (extreme increase of net capital 
inflows), global factors like global risk aversion and global growth are significantly associated 
with the occurrence of surges. They also find that surges are predominantly liability driven after 
disaggregating the surges into liability flows and asset flows. 
Following Forbes and Warnock’s (2104) findings that a significantly large portion of extreme 
capital inflows are debt led, I question whether the type of debt matters in driving these episodes, 
disaggregating debt into private or public debt inflow components. Using a large cross section of 
developing countries, Alfaro at el (2014) examined whether private and public net capital flows 
affect productivity growth differently, and thus whether it is the aggregate of those two that leads 
to mixed results with respect to upstream flows. They find that net private capital flows are 
positively correlated with countries’ growth while net sovereign debt flows are negatively 
correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by other sovereign nations or a public 
creditor. From a policy perspective, it may be more meaningful and important to consider the 






because they bring the potential of sudden reversals of that debt inflow or an increase in interest 
on accumulated debt. 
 
I examine the factors (global and domestic) associated with both extreme large private and 
public debt inflows by drawing on the existing literature. Recent studies have identified a range of 
global push and domestic pull factors as possible determinants of extreme capital (debt) flows to 
emerging economies (e.g., Forbes and Warnock (2012), Forbes and Warnock (2014) and Ghosh 
et al (2014)).  I explain below the choice of factors and their expected impact on public versus 
private debt flows. 
In this study, I consider the following global factors: global interest rates, global risk 
aversion, and global GDP growth. I include the US long-term 10-year government bond interest 
rate as a measure of global interest rates. The global interest rate affects the cost of servicing the 
debt and the likelihood of default. Hence, an increase in the global interest rate is expected to lower 
the level of debt flows into EMEs and vice versa. The second global factor that affects not only 
financial asset prices, but also extreme debt flows is global risk aversion. Global risk is related to 
macroeconomic instability. A high global risk index (measured by the CBOE volatility of the S&P 
500 index) makes investment in risky assets less attractive, which is likely to lower the flows of 
debt (capital) to EMEs since developed countries are mostly considered safe even in times of high 
market uncertainties. The third global factor is global GDP growth.  All else equal, higher world 
growth is an indication or would mean higher incomes to invest (save) worldwide, meaning greater 







In terms of the  domestic factors that are important  for determining both private and public debt 
flows, I focus on  institutional quality of the recipient country, the economic performance of the 
country, the country’s level of international reserves relative to GDP, the current account balance 
relative to GDP, the level of financial openness of the country, and the level of the country’s credit 
that is  provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP. Alfaro et al (2008) point to institutions 
as being a key indicator of the socio-economic and political stability of a country. Investors are 
more confident investing in a country where the security of their investment is not just promised 
but will be realized. Hence, a country with better institutions is more likely to attract more foreign 
debt flows. I also include real GDP per capita growth among the domestic factors as a measure of 
a country’s economic growth. A fast-growing economy is more likely to attract large debt flows 
(foreign investment) especially from international private lenders because investors may be 
attracted to the potential productivity gains and returns. The level of a country’s international 
reserves significantly influences how debt flows in or out of the country especially when financial 
stress increases (Alberola et al, 2015). For this reason, many emerging economies accumulate 
reserves through the central banks to protect the domestic credit markets. I measure this effect by 
using the ratio of foreign reserves to GDP of a country among the domestic variables. I also include 
a measure for a country’s current account balance position relative to GDP. A country’s current 
account balance measures the difference between its domestic saving and domestic investment. 
Government uses fiscal policy as a buffer during economic downturns (countercyclical Keynesian 
policy). That is, most EME’s increase their fiscal deficit (access international government credit) 
during recession to stabilize their economies or balance their economic budget.  I expect a current 
account deficit to trigger an increase in debt (particularly public debt) flows to EMEs and vice 






and Ito (2008). A country that is more open to international capital transactions is likely to attract 
more debt inflows. I include domestic credit provided by the financial sector as a share of GDP to 
measure a country’s banking sector depth and financial sector development in terms of size. Higher 
domestic credit indicates better financial development in a country and would pull in additional 
external private debt, allowing residents to smooth their consumption or output (promote risk 
sharing). 
III. Empirical Methodology 
I use annual net debt flow data in a sample of 28 EMEs over the period from 1990 through 
2016. Following Ghosh et al (2014), I identify a surge as a sharp increase in net public or private 
debt inflows and use the most common identification method in the existing empirical literature, 
that of a threshold method to identify a surge. Several methodologies have been used in identifying 
capital flow episodes. The threshold approach is the most common approach used in the empirical 
literature applied to aggregate capital flows. Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) define a bonanza of 
total net capital flows (as a percent of GDP) by selecting a threshold of 20th percentile across 
countries using quarterly data on gross inflows from 1980 through 2009. Forbes and Warnock 
(2012) define a surge as an annual increase in gross inflows that exceeds one standard deviation 
above the (five-year rolling) average and where the increase is at least two standard deviations 
more than the average in at least one quarter. Ghosh et al. (2014) use annual data on net capital 
flows and define a surge episode based on  two criteria : (i) define an observation as a surge episode 
if it falls within the top 30th percentile of the country’s own distribution of net capital flows (as a 
percentage of GDP); and (ii) to be classified as an episode, the observation also has to lie within 
the top 30th percentile of the whole  sample’s distribution of net capital flows (as a percentage of 






Thus, I define a surge if the net debt flows lies within the top 30th percentile of the country’s 
distribution and lies within the top 30th percentile of the entire countries distribution of net debt 
flows as a percentage of GDP and call this the full sample definition.  I also define a surge if net 
debt flows lie within the top 30th percentile of the country’s own distribution of net debt flows as 
a percentage of GDP and call this the country sample definition. 
III A. Public and Private Debt Decomposition 
To decompose total external debt flows into its private and public components. I follow 
Alfaro et al (2014), who define an appropriate measure of net private and public capital flows. 
They examined the correlation between net capital flows and growth and showed that such 
correlation can have different signs when capital flows are divided into public versus private 
capital flows. Depending on which one dominates the other in a data sample determines the overall 
correlation sign between capital flows and growth.  Figure 1 shows the decomposition used by 
Alfaro et al (2014).  I apply this method to data from the International Debt Statistics of the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) database, which provides information on the annual 
changes in a country’s debt stocks (stock of liabilities minus stock of assets).  I define public debt 
in two ways: 1. sovereign to sovereign debt or official public debt (OPD) and 2. total public debt, 
i.e. the sum of official public debt and public and publicly guaranteed debt financed by private 
creditors (TPuD) similar to Alfaro et al (2014).  I also define private debt in two ways: 1. private 
non-guaranteed debt (PNGD) and 2. total private debt, i.e. the sum of private non-guaranteed debt 
and short-term debt (TPvD). 
III. B. Identifying Surges 
  I define a surge as any year where the net debt inflows exceed some threshold value, using 






country’s own specific characteristics and the entire (cross countries) sample specifics, I define 
the surge to include the entire sample distribution. Thus, a surge is identified where the observation 
lies within the top 30th percentile of the country’s own distribution of net debt flows and lies in 
the top 30th percentile for the entire sample distribution of net debt flows as a percentage of GDP 
(full sample). Second, I redefine a surge as an observation that lies within the top 30th percentile 
of the country’s own distribution of net debt flows as a percentage of GDP (country sample). For 
the full sample surge identification method, I have 222 surges observations for each of the four 
surge measures (OPD surge, TPuD surge, PNGD surge and TPvD surge) which is about 30 percent 
of the total sample. For the country sample surge identification method, I have 210 surges 
observations for each of the four surge measures (OPD surge, TPuD surge, PNGD surge and TPvD 
surge), which is about 28.3 percent of the total sample.  
  Tables 1.8a and 1.8b list the countries defined as having a surge in public debt  while Tables 
1.8c and 1.8d show surges of  private debt using the full sample surge identification while Tables 
1.9a and 1.9b list the countries defined as having a surge in public debt while Tables 1.9c and 1.9d 
show surges of private debt using the country sample surge identification. Focusing on Albania in 
Table 1.8a (list of countries with surge in official public debt) in the full sample for example, there 
is a surge duration of 1990-1996 for official public debt for Albania and the next surge period 
happened in year 1998. This means that a surge occurred (S=1) in each year for Albania for official 
public debt from 1990-1996 and again in 1998, but no surge occurred (S=0) in 1997. In the case 
of the country sample, a surge in official public debt occurred for Albania 1990 and the next surge 
occurred in year 1992 (Table 1.9a). This means that a surge occurred (S=1) in 1990 for Albania 






sample definitions to capture surges in debt that are large for a particular country and those that 
are large across all countries. 
The threshold approach is appropriate here to ensure a consistent and fair treatment across 
countries while allowing significant cross-country variation in the absolute threshold of the 
episodes. Further, using alternative methods in calculating a surge help determine whether the 
outcome of the study is sensitive to how the surges are defined. 
III. C How different are Surges from Normal inflows? 
As a first step in examining the debt surges, I estimate a quantile regression to determine 
whether these surges behave distinctly differently from the normal debt flows across the entire 
sample. I follow Ghosh et al. (2014) who used the quantile regressions to establish that large capital 
inflows (surges in total capital inflows) behave qualitatively differently from the normal capital 
flows,  thus justifying the focus on surges in capital inflows.2 I estimate equations 1 and 2 below 
through quantile regression to show that surges in private and public debt flows behave 










𝑞 + Ꜫ𝑖𝑡           𝑞 = 30,50,70,90           (2)  
where PrivDebtit and PubDebtit denote the net private and public debt expressed as a percentage 
of GDP respectively, to country i at time t. G and D denote global and  domestic factors, q 
represents the different quantiles of net debt flows (percentage of GDP), and Ꜫ is the random error 
term.  
 
2 Ghosh et al. (2104) estimated a quantile regression to assess whether large capital inflows (surges in total capital 
inflows) behave qualitatively different from the normal capital flows. Forbes and Warnock (2012) assume the behavior 
of the capital episodes are distinctly different from the normal capital flows and do not test this directly.   
3 The quantile regressions (equations 1 and 2) are on the levels of the debts flows whiles the probit model (equation 






III. D Occurrence of Surges 
To examine the role of the global and domestic factors in the likelihood of having a debt 
surge, I estimate a probit model of the following form: 
Pr(𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 1) = 𝐹(𝐺𝑡
′𝛼1 + 𝐷𝑡
′𝛽1)                        (3)  
𝑆𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country i experiences a surge in period t; G 
and D denote vectors of global and domestics factors lagged by one period. Equation 3 is the key 
equation in this study. I use lagged values of both the global and domestic factors to curb any 
potential issue of endogeneity (Ghosh et al. 2014). I also include region specific effects and cluster 
the standard errors at the country level. The clustered standard errors account 
for   heteroskedasticity across “clusters” (countries) in the data and help mitigate the likelihood of 
correlation in the error term when analyzing panel data, where each unit is observed across time.4 
Second, I account for regional differences. The sample is characterized by heterogeneous countries 
that differ in their ability to attract inflows. By assigning region dummies I group them according 
to their continents since countries within a particular continent may share some common 
characteristics. The five regions considered are Africa, Asia, Europe, South America (Latin) and 
North/Central America.5  
III. E Magnitude of debt flows during Surges  
After identifying the likelihood of a debt surge occurring using the probit model, I measure 
the magnitude of each of the surges and examine the determinants of the size of the surge. I 
 
4 Using robust standard errors produce greater significant results than the clustered standard errors. However, I report 
only the results with clustered standard errors.  
5 The regions and their corresponding countries are Africa ( Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Tunisia ), 
Asia ( Armenia, Azerbaijan, China , India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and 
Vietnam), Europe ( Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria and Ukraine), South America (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 






estimate this by regressing each type of debt flow conditional on the surge occurring on the same 
independent variables considered previously.  
(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝐺𝑡
′𝛼1 + 𝐷𝑡
′𝛽1 + Ꜫ𝑖𝑡                  (4)  
(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝐺𝑡
′𝛼1 + 𝐷𝑡
′𝛽1 + Ꜫ𝑖𝑡                   (5)    
 (𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡) and (𝑃𝑢𝑏𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑖𝑡|𝑆𝑖𝑡) are the private debt flows (to GDP) and public debt flows 
(to GDP) respectively to country i in time t, conditional on a surge. G and D are vectors of global 
and domestic factors lagged one period and Ꜫ is the random error term. I include region-specific 
effects in equation 4 and 5 and cluster the standard errors at the country level. 
IV. Data description 
IV. A Decomposition of debt flows 
 In this study, I use annual Data for 28 EMEs from 1990-2016. The International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database issued by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the standard data 
source for a country’s total capital flows (Alfaro et al, 2014). However, this source does not 
provide unique and comprehensive division of debt securities by private and public issuers and 
holders. This is especially true for EMEs, which are the focus of this study.  I therefore rely on the 
International Debt Statistics (IDS) of the World Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) 
database, which provides detailed information on the decomposition into the private and public 
issuers and holders of a country’s total debt flows.  Figure 1 shows the decomposition used by 
Alfaro et al (2014). It displays graphically net external debt as the sum of short-term debt, long-
term debt, and use of IMF credits. However, long-term debt is decomposed into private non-
guaranteed debt (which is solely private) and the public and publicly guaranteed debt. While public 
and publicly guaranteed debts (PPG) are public from the debtor standpoint, the creditor in the total 






ways. The first is Official Public Debt (OPD), which is the sum of public and publicly guaranteed 
debt by official creditors (i.e. bilateral and multilateral public flows) and IMF credits (considered 
official public debt as they are provided by a quasi-government body). Second is Total Public Debt 
(TPuD), which is the sum of the official public debt and public and publicly guaranteed debt when 
creditors are private entities (i.e. commercial banks and corporate bonds). One challenge with this 
decomposition of debt flows is that it is difficult to separate short-term debt into private and public 
components. Alfaro et al. (2014) assign short term flows to private flows. However, I consider 
them separately in this study and thus measure private debt in two ways. First, I define private debt 
as the Private Non-guaranteed Debt (PNGD). Second, I define private debt as Total Private Debt 
(TPvD) calculated asthe sum of Private Non-guaranteed Debt and the short-term external debt 
(similar to Alfaro et al. (2014)).  I compare the responses of PNGD and TPvD to those of OPD 
and TPuD.  
I measure global interest rates by the US long-term 10-year government bond interest rate, 
which is considered as the standard indicator for the long-term interest rate. For global risk, I use 
the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) which measures the implied volatility of Standard & Poor (S&P) 
500 index. To measure the state of the global economy, I use the average of GDP growth (in real 
terms) of the G7 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United 
States).  Data for the first two global factors (US 10-year long-term government bond interest rate 
and VIX) were obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic Data and real GDP data from the G7 
countries were obtained from the World Bank database.  
I include six variables to capture the domestic factors in this study. I measure a country’s 
economic performance by the real GDP per capita growth (natural logarithm of the ratio of real 






position of a country as the ratio of current account balance position relative to GDP. If there is a 
deficit on the current account balance, it means the country is not generating enough savings to 
finance its own investment needs and must attract surplus foreign savings in the form of a capital 
(debt) inflow to balance the account. I also measure a country’s reserves as the ratio of international 
reserves to GDP. Domestic credit is measured as the domestic credit provided by the financial 
sector as a share of GDP. When domestic financial institutions, such as banks, are well structured, 
more reliable, and able to supply adequate loanable funds to domestic investors, all else equal, it 
leads to a decline in the inflow of foreign debt. Similarly, better domestic financial institutions 
could mean more ability to borrow from abroad (i.e., knowing funds are safe) and this could 
complement foreign flows of debt Data for these variables are taken from the World Bank 
Development Indicators. I measure capital controls or de jure financial openness using the 
KAOPEN index by Chinn and Ito (2008), which is based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This index is normalized between zero and 
one where higher values of this index indicate that a country is more open to cross-border capital 
transactions.  
There are several data sources available when it comes to measuring institutional quality. 
I use the Kauffman and Kraay World Governance Indicator (WGI) index, which is a composite 
indicator based on over 30 data sources. The WGI index is a research dataset summarizing the 
views on the quality of governance provided by many enterprises, citizen and expert survey 
respondents, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and private 
sector firms. This dataset is combined and scaled to create six broad dimensions of governance for 
over 200 countries and territories over the period 1996 to 2017 but without 1997 and 2001. These 






Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. I use the 
average (composite measure) of all these measures as a measure of institutional quality index. The 
composite measure ranges from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to better governance 
(a more stable political country and an absence of crime or low crime rate country). Also, because 
this measure of institutional quality is slow to change (and most variation comes from cross-
country comparisons rather than the time variation) and the data starts from 1996 where as my 
research starts 1991, I assign 1996 values backward, that is I assign 1996 values to 1991-1996, 
1998 values to 1997-1998, 2000 values to 1999-2000 and 2002 values to 2001-2002. From 2003 
through to 2016, data was available for each of the years. 
IV. B. Descriptive Statistics 
Tables 1.1a -1.1c provide the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this study. Table 1a. 
shows the descriptive statistics of the variables in levels. The four debt flows (which are the 
variables of interest) in level form show both positive and negative values, hence they do not 
clearly show the direction of the debt flows although on average the values are negative, indicating 
outflow. Tables 1.1b and 1.1c show the distinction between the surges and non-surges. I define an 
observation as a surge if net debt flows lie within the top 30th percentile of the country’s and the 
entire countries distribution of net debt flows as a percentage of GDP (full sample) and if net debt 
flows lie within the top 30th percentile of the country’s own distribution of net debt flows as a 
percentage of GDP (country sample). Here, the minimum, mean, and maximum values of all four 
debt surges are positive. This shows the direction of the debt surges, where a positive value 






GDP surge is 3.9%, the average of TPuD surge flows to GDP is 5.3%, the average of PNGD surge 
flows to GDP is 4.0% and the average of TPvD surge flow to GDP is 6.6%.6 
Table 1.2a provides a correlation analysis among the different types of debt flows while 
Tables 1.2b and 1.2c show the correlation analysis among the four different surges using the full 
sample and the country sample respectively. Table 1.2a shows that official public debt is positively 
correlated to total public debt, (correlation of .62), but the correlation becomes weaker with private 
non-guaranteed debt (0.07) and total private debt (0.10). The correlation between the two measures 
of private debt flow is strongly positive, about 0.56. With regard to the surges, Tables 1.2b and 
1.2c show the correlation between official public debt (OPD) surge and both private debt surge 
measures are negative.  In Table 1.2b for example, the correlation between official public debt 
surge and private non-guaranteed debt surge is -0.017, but with total private debt surge is -0.035. 
However, the correlation between either the total public debt surge (sum of OPD and Public and 
Publicly Guaranteed debt from private creditors) and each of the private debt surge measures is 
positive, about.045, meaning PPG debt from private creditors is the debt component driving this 
positive relation between TPuD and the private debts.  The correlation matrix in both Table 2a and 
Table 2b show a similar pattern.  
V. Results and Interpretation 
In this section, I first examine whether debt inflows to EMEs behave significantly 
differently from the normal flows. Then I discuss the findings on my main question, which is what 
factors (both global and domestic) determine the likelihood of a surge (extreme large increase in 
foreign debt flows).  I then discuss the magnitudes of these surges. 
 






V. A.   Results from Quantile Regression 
For comparative purpose, I present both OLS and quantile regressions of both net private 
debt to GDP and net public debt to GDP in Tables 1.3a, 1.3b and 1.3c (the OLS results in cols. [1] 
and quantile results in cols. [2]- [5]). The OLS result shows that global market uncertainty is a 
common determinant that drives both private and public debt inflows in levels into emerging 
countries.  
Moving beyond the OLS results, I show that large flows behave significantly differently 
from normal flows, and hence deserve a separate analysis. The quantile regression results show 
that the association between both types of debt flows and several of the push and pull factors 
depends on the magnitude of the flows. For example, in Table 1.3a (quantile results for the net 
official public debt) the coefficients of global market uncertainly, global interest rate, KAOPEN, 
CA/GDP, ratio of reserves to GDP, and institutional quality are increasing as the percentile for the 
distribution increases.  This similar argument holds for the private debt flows as shown in Tables 
3c and 3d. Among the factors that drive both private debt flows, the coefficients on KAOPEN, 
CA/GDP, and ratio of reserves to GDP are larger and increase along different points along the 
private debt flow distribution. These results generally suggest that there are significant differences 
in the responsiveness of debt flows to the various push and pull factors at different points along 
the debt distribution and more importantly the difference in the responses (coefficients) increases 
as the percentile of the distribution increases, thus justifying my focus on surges.  
V. B. Main findings – Determinants of Debt Surges 
The main results from this study are reported in Tables 1.4a and 1.4b. These two tables show the 
key drivers of surges for the different types of public and private debts in this study using both the 






 V.B.(i). Determinants of Public Debt Surges  
Table 1.4a shows that an increase in global market uncertainty increases the likelihood of public 
debt (both official public debt and public debt financed by private creditors) surges to EMEs. A 
higher global interest rate, which signals the high cost of borrowing from foreign investors or 
institutions for EME’s, is positively correlated to the official public debt surges. This finding is 
consistent with the countercyclical Keynesian policy, where government uses fiscal policy as a 
buffer during economic downturns. That is, most EME’s increase their fiscal deficit (access 
international government credit) during periods of global uncertainties or recession to stabilize 
their economies because of the countercyclical nature of international government borrowing 
(Galindo and Panizza (2018)).  
In the case of domestic factors, the positive and significant coefficient of the KAOPEN 
index shows that countries that are better integrated into global financial markets are more likely 
to attract large public debts. A reduction in the accumulation of international reserves increases 
the likelihood of a public debt surge in EME’s.  That is, an emerging market can increase its foreign 
reserves by lending abroad (buying US Treasury securities for example) so a decrease in reserves 
means a reversal of public lending (selling off these securities). Also, domestic GDP per capita 
growth, institutional quality, and the current account deficit, are significant and have the expected 
signs. That is, the result shows that higher GDP per capita attracts public debt surges into EME’s 
while emerging markets with weak institutions are more likely to attract large public debt like IMF 
credits to strength their institutions and stabilize the economy. The coefficient on the current 
account deficit is statistically significantly negative, meaning the country is not generating enough 






of a capital (debt) inflow to balance the account. The results in Table 1.4a are remarkably similar 
across the different definition of public debt surges using the full sample versus the country sample. 
 
 V.B.(ii). Determinants of Private Debt Surges 
 
  Table 1.4b shows that private debt surges to EMEs are statistically and significantly 
influenced by global risk and global real GDP growth (in both the full sample and the country 
sample). That is, private debt surges (using the private debt measure that includes short-term debts) 
become more likely in periods when global real GDP growth is sluggish or when there is low risk 
or uncertainty in the financial markets. This result is only true for total private debt (TPvD) surges, 
i.e. it is true when the private debt measure includes short term debts but in the case of private debt 
without short-term debt (PNGD) the result is insignificant. This result is in line with Rey (2013) 
that large short-term capital (debt) flows to EMEs are mostly determined by global factors, 
particularly global risk.  
Turning to the domestic factors, the positive association between private debt surge (private 
non-guaranteed debt) and international  reserves supports the argument that higher level of reserves 
serves as an implicit insurance of foreign investors, thus reducing the riskiness of an investment 
in the domestic economy and hence enhancing the inflow of debt flows to EME’s (similar to 
Aizenman and Marion (2004)). Also, the result shows that EMEs that are better integrated into the 
financial markets (higher KAOPEN) are more likely to attract private non-guaranteed debts 
(private debt that excludes the short-term debt). When a country has a large current account deficit, 
it is usually investing more abroad than saving at home, meaning foreign investors are essentially 
financing the country either through the government or private investors. The negative and 






current account deficit attracts private debt surges.  Also, the positive relationship between real 
GDP per capita growth and private surge (large private non-guaranteed debt) suggest that fast 
growing countries or countries with high real GDP per capita growth are more likely to experience 
large private surge. Investors are more confident investing in countries with better institutional 
quality, hence I expected the coefficient of institutional quality for total private surge to be positive 
and significant.  Instead, it is significantly negative. The negative relation is influenced by the 
short-term debt in the total private debt, thus better institutional quality is associated with fewer 
surges in short term debt (or worse institutional quality tends to draw in short-term private debt 
surges). 
V. C. Magnitudes of private and public debt surges 
The estimation results reported in Table 1.7a and Table 1.7b show the magnitude of the 
occurrence of both public and private debt surges respectively. In the case of the public debt surge 
(official public debt), the result shows that all the global factors (interest rate, VIX, global GDP 
growth) are positive and statistically significant but only the global interest rate is significant when 
the public debt measure includes public debt by public creditors and public debt by private 
creditors (TPuD). This shows that global factors increase the size of public debt surges especially 
when the debt is an official public debt. Domestic factors such as financial openness (KAOPEN), 
current account deficit, small size of the domestic credit and poor institutional quality increases 
the size of the public debt surge. Also, the result shows that more accumulation of international 
reserves as a ratio GDP leads to a decrease in the size of public debt surge.  
However, in the case of the private debt surge, the results from the magnitude regression 
conditional on private debt surge (private debt that includes short-term debt) occurrence showed 






However, when private debt is measure as private non-guaranteed debt, global interest rate is 
negative and significant while international reserves is positive and significant. 
V. D Robustness Check 
V.D.1 Alternative Threshold Measure 
In this section, I check the robustness of the empirical results. First, I utilize an alternative 
threshold measure for surge identification similar to Reinhart and Reinhart (2008), who  defined a 
bonanza or surge of total net capital flows (as a percent of GDP) by selecting a threshold of 20th 
percentile across countries using quarterly data on gross inflows from 1980 through 2009.  I use 
this approach here and define surges as net debt flows that lies within the top 20th percentile of 
either the country’s distribution (country sample) or both the country’s and the entire countries in 
the sample distribution (full sample).  
The results are robust to the different surge identification thresholds used in this study (as 
shown in Table 1.4[a &b] and Table 1.5[a &b]) particularly for global factors. Higher levels of 
global market uncertainty (VIX) are positively (negatively) associated with public (private non-
guaranteed) debt surge while an increase in global GDP growth lowers the likelihood of a private 
debt (private debt measure that includes short-term debt) surge. Also, a higher global interest rate 
is associated with large inflows of official public debt into EMEs. Also, in the case of the domestic 
factors, the results from either surge identification measure are qualitatively identical for both 
types of public and private debt surge. Table 1.5a shows that a country that is more financially 
integrated, has a deficit on its current account balance, or has low foreign reserves is more likely 
to experience a public debt surge (similar to the findings in Table 1.4a).  Results in Table 1.5b 






quality and real GDP per capita growth are the determinants of private debt surge, which is in line 
with results in Table 1.4b. KAOPEN is the only factor that is significant when using the top 30th 
percentile surge measure to measure the likelihood of PNGD surge but becomes insignificant when 
using the 20th percentile surge measure.   
V.D.2 Global Risk Measures 
Global risk appears to be a big driver to both private and public debt surges regardless of 
the surge identification method. Hence, I consider other measures of global risks, examining how 
it drives these surges and whether the results are robust or sensitive to the measure of global risk. 
VOX is an older version of VIX.  VOX measures volatility using the market prices on the 
S&P 100 options index while VIX measures volatility using market prices on S&P 500 option 
index. The correlation between VIX and VOX is extremely high. about .98, for the period 1990-
2016. Tables 1.6a and 1.6b show the entire regression results for the two surge identification 
measures using both global risk measures. There are not many changes in the results when both 
VOX and VIX are used. The factors that were significant for VIX remain significant for VOX and 
keep their expected coefficient signs as well. The only difference is that the size of the coefficients 
is bigger when VIX is used compared to VOX for most of the factors.  
Overall, increases in the broad risk measures (VIX and VOX) increase the occurrence of 
public debt surges (both OPD and TPuD) and decrease the occurrence of private debt surge (TPvD) 
among EMEs.  
VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines the determinants of debt flow surges to emerging economies. I focus 






28 EMEs over 1990-2016, I decompose external debt flows into large surges of private non-
guaranteed debt (PNGD), total private debt (TPvD = PNGD plus short-term debt), official public 
debt (OPD) and total public debt (TPuD = OPD plus PPG from private creditors). The results 
suggest public debt (both OPD and TPuD) and private debt (TPvD) surges are driven by both 
global and domestic factors, but these surges are more sensitive to global factors than domestic 
factors. Also, global factors that affect the occurrence of public and private (TPvD) debt flow 
surges drive them in opposite direction. In the case of global risk for instance, while higher levels 
of global market uncertainty (VIX) significantly reduces the inflow of total private debt surges to 
EMEs, public debt still surges in the face of growing global uncertainty. In determining the size 
(magnitude) of these surges, the results show that the size of public debt surges is more sensitive 
to the global factors than the domestic factors. The size of private non-guaranteed debt surge is 
only influenced by global interest rate and foreign reserves, but once short-term debt is considered 
as private debt, the significance of these two factors is lost. 
In conclusion, the result shows that global factors, particularly global market uncertainty, 
play a dominant role in driving the surges in public and private debt flows to EMEs. Also since 
these debt flows are more sensitive to global factors, which are beyond the control of the domestic 
countries, governments or policymakers in these (EMEs) should focus more on policies such as 
macroprudential measures or capital controls that will improve the country’s resilience to 
financial-stability risks and strengthen their  ability to withstand the influx of debt (capital) flows 
into their countries rather than to attempt to directly reduce these inflows. Additionally, with global 
factors playing a dominant role in driving these debt surges, there is a need for a multilateral 
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FIGURE 1: Decomposition of Net External Debt Flows into Private and Public components. 
 
 
Source: Alfaro et al. (2014) 





















 Observation  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Net official public debt 
flow to GDP (in %) 
742 -1.150 48.980 -1322.747 45.148 
Net total public debt 
flow to GDP (in %) 
742 -5.122 169.909 -4623.594 92.412 
Net private non-
guaranteed det flow to 
GDP (in %) _  
742 -1.484 63.347 -1719.302 32.934 
Net total private debt 
flow to GDP (in %) _  
742 -3.741 140.349 -1719.302 49.696 
Global volatility risk 
Index (VIX) 
756 19.677 5.763 12.389 32.693 
Global interest rate 756 4.043 2.019 0.902 8.792 
Global world growth 756 0.016 0.014 -0.043 0.037 
KAOPEN (financial 
openness) 
717 0.366 0.271 0 1 
Current account to 
GDP 
717 -1.475 6.634 -30.688 33.679 
Reserves to GDP 717 0.010 0.043 -0.311 0.218 
Institutional Quality 
Index 
753 -0.327 0.457 -1.260 1.861 
Domestic credit to 
GDP 
734 58.117 42.617 -12.698 215.183 
Real GDP per capita 
Growth 







Table 1.1b. summary statistics for the different surge types (using the full sample) 
 
 
Table 1.1c. summary statistics for the different surge types (using the country sample). 
 Observation  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Surges      
OPD/GDP (as %) 210 3.619 4.370 0.073 45.148 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 210 5.157 7.735 0.353 92.412 
PNGD/GDP (as %) 210 3.775 4.781 0.002 32.934 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 210 6.310 6.946 0.169 49.696 
      
Non-Surges      
OPD/GDP (as %) 532 -3.033 57.686 -
1322.747 
5.918 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 532 -9.180 202.511 -
4623.594 
5.644 
PNGD/GDP (as %) 532 -3.560 74.670 -
1719.302 
10.188 







 Observation  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Surges      
OPD/GDP (as %) 222 3.895 4.088 1.139 45.148 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 222 5.320 7.434 1.963 92.412 
PNGD/GDP (as %) 222 4.021 4.591 1.019 32.934 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 222 6.569 6.610 2.141 49.696 
      
Non-Surges      
OPD/GDP (as %) 520 -3.304 58.331 -1322.747 1.123 
TPuD/GDP (as %) 520 -9.580 202.800 -4623.594 1.961 
PNGD/GDP (as %) 520 -3.834 75.511 -1719.302 1.015 






Table 1.2a Correlation Matrix among the different types of debt flows measure. 
 TPuD/GDP  OPD/GDP  PNGD/GDP  TPvD/GDP  
TPuD/GDP  1.000    
OPD/GDP  0.621 1.000   
PNGD/GDP  0.376 0.073 1.000  
TPvD/GDP  0.326 0.101 0.555 1.000 
 
 










TPuD/GDP_ Surge 1.000    
OPD/GDP_ Surge 0.575 1.000   
PNGD/GDP_ 
Surge 
0.045 -0.017 1.000  
TPvD/GDP _Surge 0.045 -0.035 0.624 1.000 
 
 










TPuD/GDP_ Surge 1.000    
OPD/GDP_ Surge 0.562 1.000   
PNGD/GDP_ 
Surge 
0.009 -0.009 1.000  












Table 1.3a.  
OLS and Quantile Regression for Official Public Debt flows  
Dependent Variable: net official public debt flow to GDP (log OPD/GDP) 
 
                                 OLS                                         Quantile Regressions (Percentile) 
  30th 50th 70th 90th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Global Factors      


































     




































































Observation 657 657 657 657 657 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.100 0.031 0.055 0.117 0.199 
Notes: Dependent variable is net official public debt flow to GDP (log)to GDP.  All the independent variables are 
lagged one period. Constant and region-specific effects are included in all specifications. Clustered and bootstrapped 
standard errors (with 100 replications) are reported in parentheses for OLS and quantile regressions respectively.  ***, 












Table 1.3b.  
OLS and Quantile Regression for net total public debt flows to GDP  
Dependent Variable: net total public debt flow to GDP (log TPuD/GDP) 
 
                                 OLS                                         Quantile Regressions (Percentile) 
  30th 50th 70th 90th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Global Factors      


































     




































































Observation 657 657 657 657 657 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.115 0.027 0.031 0.052 0.102 
Notes: Dependent variable is net total public debt flow to GDP (log)to GDP.  All the independent variables are lagged 
one period. Constant and region-specific effects are included in all specifications. Clustered and bootstrapped standard 
errors (with 100 replications) are reported in parentheses for OLS and quantile regressions respectively.  ***, ** and 













OLS and Quantile Regression for net private non-guaranteed debt flows to GDP 
Dependent Variable: net private non-guaranteed debt to GDP (log PNGD/GDP) 
 
                                   OLS                                         Quantile Regressions (Percentile) 
  30th 50th 70th 90th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Global Factors      


































     






































































Observation 657 657 657 657 657 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.178 0.014 0.036 0.0615 0.115 
Notes: Dependent variable is net private non-guaranteed debt to GDP (log). All the independent variables are lagged 
one period. Constant and region-specific effects are included in all specifications. Clustered and bootstrapped standard 
errors (with 100 replications) are reported in parentheses for OLS and quantile regressions respectively.  ***, ** and 











Table 1.3d.  
             OLS and Quantile Regression for net total private debt flows to GDP  
Dependent Variable: net total private debt to GDP (log TPvD/GDP) 
 
                                   OLS                                         Quantile Regressions (Percentile) 
  30th 50th 70th 90th 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Global Factors      


































     





































































Observation 657 657 657 657 657 
Regional 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared 0.202 0.052 0.061 0.088 0.131 
Notes: Dependent variable is net total private debt to GDP (log). All the independent variables are lagged one period. 
Constant and region-specific effects are included in all specifications. Clustered and bootstrapped standard errors (with 
100 replications) are reported in parentheses for OLS and quantile regressions respectively.  ***, ** and * indicate 











Table 1.4a.   Occurrence of public debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is 1 if a debt surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
                                                       Full Sample                                      Country Sample  
 
Debt Construction          TPuD/GDP               OPD/GDP            TPuD/GDP            OPD/GDP               
                          
Global Factors     
























Domestic Factors     






















































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.104 0.185 0.080 0.132 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 











Table 1.4b.   Occurrence of private debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
                                             Full Sample                                           Country Sample  
                                               
  Debt Construction          TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP            TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP                  
 
Global Factors     
























Domestic Factors     






















































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.052 0.069 0.023 0.036 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 









Table 1.5a. Sensitivity analysis: alternative threshold measure for surge identification (debt 
within the top 20th percentile) 
Occurrence of public debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
                                               Full Sample                                                Country Sample  
                                                     
Debt Construction          TPuD/GDP          OPD/GDP               TPuD/GDP            OPD/GDP               
 
Global Factors     


























Domestic Factors     
























































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.157 0.232 0.058 0.147 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 
period. R-squared for cols [1] & [2] are Pseudo R-squared. Full Sample= Define a surge if net debt flows lies within 
the top 20th percentile of the country’s and the entire countries in the sample distribution of net debt flows (as a 
percentage of GDP). Country Sample= Define a surge if net debt flows lie within the top 20th percentile of the 






 1.5b. Sensitivity analysis: alternative threshold measure for surge identification (debt within 
the top 20th percentile) 
Occurrence of private debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
                                            Full Sample                                              Country Sample  
 
Debt Construction        TPvD/GDP             PNGD/GDP               TPvD/GDP         
PNGD/GDP                                           
Global Factors     


























Domestic Factors     
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Observation 664 664 664 667 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.098 0.078 0.020 0.022 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 
period. R-squared for cols [1] & [2] are Pseudo R-squared. Full Sample= Define a surge if net debt flows lies within 
the top 20th percentile of the country’s and the entire countries in the sample distribution of net debt flows (as a 
percentage of GDP). Country Sample= Define a surge if net debt flows lie within the top 20th percentile of the 






Table 1.6a.  
Occurrence of public debt surge with alternate global risk measures: (full sample 
threshold)  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
Debt Construction        TPuD/GDP         OPD/GDP           TPuD/GDP             OPD/GDP               
 































    

























































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.104 0.185 0.104 0.185 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 








Table 1.6b.  
Occurrence of public debt surge with alternate global risk measures: (country sample 
threshold)  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
Debt Construction          TPuD/GDP       OPD/GDP           TPuD/GDP            OPD/GDP               
 





























Domestic Factors     
























































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.080 0.132 0.080 0.133 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 








Table 1.6c. Occurrence of Private debt surge with alternate Global risk measures (full 
sample threshold)  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
Debt Construction          TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP               TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP                                            































    






















































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.052 0.069 0.052 0.069 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 











Table 1.6d. Occurrence of Private debt surge with alternate Global risk measures (country 
sample threshold)  
Dependent variable is 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise 
 
Debt Construction          TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP               TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP                                           































    
























































Observation 664 664 664 664 
Regional 
Dummies  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.023 0.036 0.024 0.036 
Notes: Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if a surge occurs and 0 otherwise. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 











Table 1.7a. Magnitude of public debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is net public debt flow to GDP conditional on surge occurrence 
 
                                                 Full Sample                                                Country Sample 
 
Debt Construction          TPuD/GDP           OPD/GDP            TPuD/GDP            OPD/GDP               
 
Global Factors     


























Domestic Factors     






















































Observation 186 181 176 173 
Regional Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.208 0.263 0.253 0.450 
Notes Dependent variable is net public debt flow to GDP conditional on surge occurrence. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 










Table 1.7b. Magnitude of private debt surges: full sample vs country sample threshold  
Dependent variable is net private debt flow to GDP conditional on surge occurrence 
 
                                                 Full Sample                                                Country Sample 
 
  Debt Construction          TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP             TPvD/GDP         PNGD/GDP                  
 
Global Factors     


























Domestic Factors     






















































Observation 208 218 195 202 
Regional Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-Squared  0.098 0.154 0.164 0.154 
Notes Dependent variable is net private debt flow to GDP conditional on surge occurrence. Statistics reported in 
parentheses are clustered standard errors (at the country level). Constant and region-specific effects are included in all 
specifications. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are lagged one 









    Table 1.8a. List of surges of official public debt/GDP (OPD/GDP) using Full Sample 
 threshold 





Country OPD/GDP _ 
Surge 
Duration 
Albania 1990-1996 Colombia 1990 Nigeria 1994-1995 
Albania 1998-2000 Colombia 1999 Nigeria 1998 
Albania 2003-2004 Colombia 2003 Nigeria 2000 
Albania 2006-2007 Costa Rica 1990-1991 Nigeria 2003-2004 
Albania 2009 Costa Rica 2009-2010 Nigeria 2009 
Albania 2012 Dominican Rep 1990-1991 Paraguay 1990 
Algeria 1990 Dominican Rep 1993 Paraguay 1994 
Algeria 1994-1996 Dominican Rep 2003-2004 Paraguay 1998-1999 
Algeria 1998 Dominican Rep 2006 Paraguay 2002-2004 
Algeria 2009 Dominican Rep 2008-2013 Philippines 1990-1994 
Argentina 1990 Ecuador 1990 Philippines 1998-1999 
Argentina 1993 Ecuador 1994-1995 Philippines 2002-2003 
Argentina 1995 Ecuador 1999-2000 Philippines 2008 
Argentina 2001 Ecuador 2010-2011 Sri Lanka 1990-1995 
Argentina 2009 Ecuador 2013 Sri Lanka 1998-1999 
Armenia 1993-1999 Ecuador 2015-2016 Sri Lanka 2002-2004 
Armenia 2001-2004 India 1992 Sri Lanka 2006-2012 
Armenia 2006-2012 India 1994 Thailand 1990 
Armenia 2015-2016 India 1999 Thailand 1997-1999 
Azerbaijan 1990 Indonesia 1990-1994 Tunisia 1990-1991 
Azerbaijan 1995-2000 Indonesia 1998-1999 Tunisia 1993-1995 
Azerbaijan 2002-2003 Indonesia 2002-2003 Tunisia 2002-2004 
Azerbaijan 2012 Kazakhstan  1990 Tunisia 2007 
Azerbaijan 2016 Kazakhstan  1993-1995 Tunisia 2009 
Belarus 1993 Kazakhstan  1997-1999 Tunisia 2011-2013 
Belarus 1995 Kazakhstan  2003 Ukraine 1993-1996 
Belarus 1999 Malaysia 1990 Ukraine 1998-1999 
Belarus 2007-2011 Malaysia 1994 Ukraine 2008-2010 
Belarus 2016 Mexico 1990 Ukraine 2014-2015 
Brazil 1990 Mexico 1995 Vietnam 1990 
Brazil 1998 Mexico 2009 Vietnam 1992-1994 
Brazil 2002 Morocco 1990 Vietnam 1998-1999 
Bulgaria 1991-1995 Morocco 1992 Vietnam 2001-2004 
Bulgaria 1998-1999 Morocco 1994-1995 Vietnam 2007-2012 
Bulgaria 2003-2004 Morocco 2006-2009 Vietnam 2016 
China 1991 Morocco 2011-2013   
China 1993 Nigeria 1990-1991   
















Albania 1990-1995 Dominican Rep 1990-1991 Paraguay 1999 
Albania 1998-2000 Dominican Rep 2003-2004 Paraguay 2003-2004 
Albania 2003-2004 Dominican Rep 2009-2011 Paraguay 2014 
Albania 2006-2010 Dominican Rep 2013 Paraguay 2016 
Algeria 1990 Ecuador 1990 Philippines 1990-1991 
Algeria 1994-1995 Ecuador 1994-1995 Philippines 1993-1994 
Argentina 1990 Ecuador 1999 Philippines 1998-1999 
Argentina 1994-1996 Ecuador 2010 Philippines 2002-2003 
Argentina 1998-1999 Ecuador 2013-2016 Philippines 2009 
Argentina 2002-2004  India 1993 South Africa 1994,1997 
Argentina 2007, 2016 Indonesia 1990-1991 South Africa 2002, 2010 
Armenia 1993-1999 Indonesia 1993-1994 South Africa 2012 
Armenia 2002-2004 Indonesia 1998-1999 Sri Lanka 1990-1991 
Armenia 2007 Indonesia 2009 Sri Lanka 1993-1995 
Armenia 2009-2011 Indonesia 2012 Sri Lanka 1998-1999 
Armenia 2015-2016 Indonesia 2015 Sri Lanka 2002-2004 
Azerbaijan 1990 Kazakhstan  1990 Sri Lanka 2007 
Azerbaijan 1994-2000 Kazakhstan 1993-1995 Sri Lanka 2009-2013 
Azerbaijan 2002-2003 Kazakhstan 1997-1999 Sri Lanka 2016 
Azerbaijan 2014, 2016 Kazakhstan 2013 Thailand 1990 
Belarus 1993, 1995 Kazakhstan 2015 Thailand 1997-1999 
Belarus 1999 Malaysia 1990 Tunisia  1990-1991 
Belarus 2007-2012 Malaysia 2001-2004 Tunisia  1994-1995 
Belarus 2016 Malaysia 2006 Tunisia  2002-2004 
Brazil 1990 ,2002 Malaysia 2008-2010 Tunisia  2007 
Bulgaria 1991 Malaysia 2012 Tunisia  2012 
Bulgaria 1998-1999 Mexico 1990, 1995 Tunisia  2015-2016 
Bulgaria 2003, 2012 Mexico 2010, 2012 Ukraine 1993-1995 
Bulgaria 2015-2016 Mexico 2014 Ukraine 1998-1999 
China 1990 Morocco 1990,1994 Ukraine 2004 
China 1992-1994 Morocco 2007, 2009 Ukraine 2007-2010 
Colombia 1990, 1999 Morocco 2012-2013 Ukraine 2015 
Colombia 2003, 2009 Nigeria 1990-1991 Vietnam 1990,1992 
Colombia 2014-2015 Nigeria 1994 Vietnam 1994 
Costa Rica 1990-1991 Nigeria 1998 Vietnam 1998-1999 
Costa Rica 2000 Nigeria 2000 Vietnam 2002-2004 
Costa Rica 2003 Nigeria 2003 Vietnam 2007-2012 
Costa Rica 2012-2015 Paraguay 1990   






 Table 1.8c. List of surges of private non-guaranteed debt/ GDP (PNGD/GDP)  













Albania 1990 Colombia 2016 Morocco 2003 
Albania 2005 Costa Rica 1990 Morocco 2015 
Albania 2008-2013 Costa Rica 2004-2005 Nigeria 1990 
Argentina 1990 Costa Rica 2009 Nigeria 2000-2001 
Argentina 1993-1998 Costa Rica 2011-2016 Nigeria 2005 
Argentina 2001 Dominican Rep. 1990 Paraguay  1990 
Argentina 2005 Dominican Rep. 2006 Paraguay 1994-1995 
Argentina 2007-2008 Dominican Rep. 2012 Paraguay 2002-2010 
Armenia 2001 Ecuador 1999 Philippines 1993-1998 
Armenia 2005 Ecuador 2002-2004 Philippines 2001 
Armenia 2007-2008 India 1994 Philippines 1993-1998 
Armenia 2010-2014 India 2000 Philippines 2001 
Armenia 2016 India 2003 Philippines 2014-2015 
Azerbaijan 1990 India 2006-2007 South Africa 1994 
Azerbaijan 1998 India 2013 South Africa 1999 
Azerbaijan 2004 Indonesia 1990-1992 South Africa 2001-2002 
Azerbaijan 2010 Indonesia 1994-1998 South Africa 2006-2007 
Azerbaijan 2015 Indonesia 2004-2005 South Africa 2009-2012 
Belarus 2001-2002 Indonesia 2009 Sri Lanka  1990 
Belarus 2009-2011 Indonesia 2011 Sri Lanka 2012-2014 
Belarus 2013-2014 Indonesia 2013-2014 Thailand 1990-1996 
Brazil 1992-1993 Kazakhstan 1990 Thailand 2002-2004 
Brazil 1996-1998 Kazakhstan 1997-1998 Thailand 2006 
Brazil 2006-2008 Kazakhstan 2000-2014 Thailand 2012 
Brazil 2010-2011 Kazakhstan 2016 Thailand 2014 
Bulgaria 1995 Malaysia 1990-1997 Tunisia 1990 
Bulgaria 2002-2009 Malaysia 1999-2000 Tunisia 1999 
Bulgaria 2012-2013 Malaysia 2004-2005 Tunisia 2001-2002 
China 1990 Malaysia 2012-2014 Tunisia 2008 
China 1998 Malaysia 2016 Ukraine 1999 
China 2014 Mexico 1990 Ukraine 2001-2008 
Colombia 1990 Mexico 1997-1999 Ukraine 2010-2011 
Colombia 1993-1997 Mexico 2011 Ukraine 2013 
Colombia 2003, 2007 Mexico 2013 Vietnam 1990 
Colombia 2010-2011 Morocco 1990, 1997 Vietnam 2010 
Colombia 2013 Morocco 1999 Vietnam 2014-2016 
















Albania 1990-1993 Colombia  1990 Nigeria 2002-2004 
Albania 2005 Colombia  1992-1997 Paraguay 1990 
Albania 2008 Colombia  2010-2011 Paraguay 1994-1995 
Albania 2010-2013 Costa Rica 2005 Paraguay 1998 
Argentina 1990 Costa Rica 2007-2008 Paraguay 2002-2010 
Argentina 1995 Costa Rica 2011-2012 Paraguay 2012 
Argentina 1997 Costa Rica 2014-2015 Philippines 1994 
Argentina 2003 Dominican Rep. 1990 Philippines 1996-1997 
Argentina 2005 Dominican Rep. 2002 Philippines 2001 
Argentina 2011 Dominican Rep. 2006-2007 Philippines 2010 
Argentina 2016 Ecuador  1993 South Africa 1994 
Armenia 2001-2003 Ecuador  2001-2002 South Africa 2004 
Armenia 2007-2008 Ecuador  2004 South Africa 2006-2007 
Armenia 2010-2011 India 2003 South Africa 2010 
Armenia 2013 India 2006-2007 Sri Lanka  1990 
Armenia 2016 Indonesia 1990-1992 Sri Lanka  1994 
Azerbaijan 1990 Indonesia 1994-1997 Sri Lanka  1999 
Azerbaijan 2000 Indonesia 2004 Sri Lanka  2007-2009 
Azerbaijan 2004 Kazakhstan 1990 Sri Lanka  2011-2012 
Azerbaijan 2010 Kazakhstan 1997-1998 Sri Lanka  2014 
Azerbaijan 2012 Kazakhstan 2000-2008 Thailand 1990-1996 
Belarus 1996 Kazakhstan 2010-2014 Thailand 2006 
Belarus 2002-2007 Kazakhstan 2016 Thailand 2009-2010 
Belarus 2009-2011 Malaysia 1990 Thailand 2012 
Belarus 2013 Malaysia 1992-1997 Tunisia 1990 
Brazil 1990 Malaysia 2004-2005 Tunisia 1999 
Brazil 1992 Malaysia 2007-2012 Tunisia 2001-2002 
Brazil 1996-1998 Malaysia 2014 Tunisia 2012 
Brazil 2007 Malaysia 2016 Ukraine 1997 
Brazil 2010 Mexico 1990-1991 Ukraine 2001-2008 
Bulgaria 1991 Mexico 1993 Ukraine 2010-2011 
Bulgaria 1993 Mexico 2010-2013 Ukraine 2013 
Bulgaria 1995-1997 Morocco 1990 Vietnam 1990 
Bulgaria 2002-2009 Morocco 1996-1997 Vietnam 1992 
Bulgaria 2012-2013 Morocco 1999, 2016 Vietnam 1995 
China 1990,2001 Nigeria 1990 Vietnam 2007 
China 2010-2011 Nigeria 1992-1995 Vietnam 2010-2012 
China 2013-2014 Nigeria 1998 Vietnam 2014,2016 






   Table 1.9a. List of surges of official public debt/GDP (OPD/GDP) using Country Sample  









Albania 1990 Colombia 2012, 2016 Morocco 2013 
Albania 1992-1994 Costa Rica 1990-1991 Nigeria 1990-1991 
Albania 1998-2000 Costa Rica 2003 Nigeria 1994-1995 
Albania 2003 Costa Rica 2009-2010 Nigeria 1998, 2000 
Algeria 1990-1991 Costa Rica 2014-2016 Nigeria 2003, 2009 
Algeria 1994-1996 Dominican Rep 1990-1991 Paraguay 1990, 1994 
Algeria 1998, 2002 Dominican Rep 2004 Paraguay 1998-1999 
Algeria 2002 Dominican Rep 2008-2012 Paraguay 2002-2004 
Argentina 1990 Ecuador 1990, 1994 Paraguay 2009 
Argentina 1993-1995 Ecuador 1999-2000 Philippines 1990-1994 
Argentina 2001,2009 Ecuador 2010-2011 Philippines 1998-1999 
Argentina 2014 Ecuador 2013, 2016 Philippines 2003 
Armenia 1993-1999 India 1991-1994 South Africa 1993, 1999 
Armenia 2009 India 1999 South Africa 2009-2010 
Azerbaijan 1990 India 2009 South Africa 2012-2014 
Azerbaijan 1995-1996 Indonesia 1990-1991 South Africa 2016 
Azerbaijan 1998-1999 Indonesia 1993-1994 Sri Lanka 1990-1991 
Azerbaijan 2002-2003 Indonesia 1998-1999 Sri Lanka 1993-1994 
Azerbaijan 2016 Indonesia 2002-2003 Sri Lanka 1998 
Belarus 1993,1995 Kazakhstan  1990 Sri Lanka 2002-2003 
Belarus 1999 Kazakhstan  1993-1995 Sri Lanka 2009 
Belarus 2007-2011 Kazakhstan  1997-1999 Thailand 1990-1991 
Brazil 1990 Kazakhstan  2003 Thailand 1997-1999 
Brazil 1998-1999 Malaysia 1990-1991 Tunisia 1990-1991 
Brazil 2001-2003 Malaysia 1994 Tunisia 1993-1995 
Brazil 2009-2010 Malaysia 1998-1999 Tunisia 2002-2004 
Bulgaria 1991-1995 Malaysia 2001 Tunisia 2012 
Bulgaria 1998-1999 Malaysia 2004 Ukraine 1993-1995 
Bulgaria 2003 Malaysia 2009 Ukraine 1999 
China 1990-1995 Mexico 1990-1991 Ukraine 2008-2010 
China 1998-1999 Mexico 1995 Ukraine 2015 
Colombia 1990,1999 Mexico 2008-2012 Vietnam 1990,01992 
Colombia 2001 Morocco 1990, 1992 Vietnam 1998-1999 
Colombia 2003 Morocco 1994 Vietnam 2002-2003 
Colombia 2008-2009 Morocco 2006-2009 Vietnam 2008-2009 












Country TPuD/GDP _ 
Surge 
Duration 
Country TPuD/GDP _ 
Surge 
Duration 
Albania 1990-1994 Costa Rica 1990-1991 Nigeria 1994 
Albania 1999-2000 Costa Rica 2000 Nigeria 1998 
Albania 2009 Costa Rica 2003 Nigeria 2000 
Algeria 1990 Costa Rica 2012-2015 Nigeria 2003-2004 
Algeria 1994-1996 Dominican Rep 1990-1991 Nigeria 2009 
Algeria 2002-2003 Dominican Rep 2003-2004 Paraguay 1990 
Algeria 2009 Dominican Rep 2009-2011 Paraguay 1998-1999 
Algeria 2016 Dominican Rep 2013 Paraguay 2003-2004 
Argentina 1990 Ecuador 1990 Paraguay 2013-2014 
Argentina 1998-1999 Ecuador 1994-1995 Paraguay 2016 
Argentina 2002-2004 Ecuador 2010 Philippines 1990-1991 
Argentina 2007 Ecuador 2013-2016 Philippines 1993-1994 
Argentina 2016 India 1991-1993 Philippines 1998-1999 
Armenia 1993-1999 India 1998 Philippines 2002-2003 
Armenia 2009 India 2009-2010 South Africa 1994 
Azerbaijan 1990 India 2012 South Africa 1997 
Azerbaijan 1995-1996 India 2014 South Africa 2002-2003 
Azerbaijan 1999-2000 Indonesia 1990-1991 South Africa 2009-2010 
Azerbaijan 2002-2003 Indonesia 1993-1994 South Africa 2012, 2016 
Azerbaijan 2016 Indonesia 1998-1999 Sri Lanka 1990-1991 
Belarus 1993, 1999 Indonesia 2009 Sri Lanka 1994,1998 
Belarus 2007-2011 Indonesia 2012 Sri Lanka 2002 
Belarus 2016 Kazakhstan 1990 Sri Lanka 2009-2010 
Brazil 1990,1992 Kazakhstan 1993-1995 Sri Lanka 2012 
Brazil 1998 Kazakhstan 1997-1999 Thailand 1990, 1993 
Brazil 2001-2003 Kazakhstan 2015 Thailand 1997-1999 
Brazil 2012 Malaysia 1990 Thailand 2010-2012 
Brazil 2014 Malaysia 2001 Tunisia  1990-1991 
Bulgaria 1991 Malaysia 2003-2004 Tunisia  1994-1995 
Bulgaria 1998-1999 Malaysia 2006 Tunisia  2002-2004 
Bulgaria 2003 Malaysia 2008-2010 Tunisia  2012 
Bulgaria 2012 Mexico 1990, 1995 Ukraine 1993-1995 
Bulgaria 2014-2016 Mexico 2001-2014 Ukraine 1998-1999 
China 1990-1997 Morocco 1990 Ukraine 2009-2010 
Colombia 1990,1999 Morocco 1994-1995 Ukraine 2015 
Colombia 2003 Morocco 2007 Vietnam 1990, 1998 
Colombia 2009 Morocco 2012-2013 Vietnam 2003 
Colombia 2013-2016 Nigeria 1990-1991 Vietnam 2007-2011 






     Table 1.9c. List of surges of private non-guaranteed debt/ GDP (PNGD/GDP) using  












Albania 1990, 2005 Colombia 2003,2010 Morocco 1990, 1997 
Albania 2008-2013 Colombia 2016 Morocco 1999 
Algeria 2002-2006 Costa Rica 1990 Morocco 2003 
Algeria 2008 Costa Rica 2004-2005 Morocco 2012-2013 
Algeria 2012, 2014 Costa Rica 2011-2012 Morocco 2015-2016 
Argentina 1990 Costa Rica 2014-2016 Nigeria 1990 
Argentina 1993-1994 Dominican Rep.  1990 Nigeria 2000-2005 
Argentina 1997-1998 Dominican Rep.  2002 Nigeria 2007 
Argentina 2001, 2005 Dominican Rep.  2006-2007 Paraguay 1990 
Argentina 2008 Dominican Rep.  2011-2012 Paraguay 2002 
Armenia 2001 Dominican Rep.  2014 Paraguay 2005-2010 
Armenia 2007-2008 Dominican Rep.  2016 Philippines  1993-1998 
Armenia 2010-2011 Ecuador 1995 Philippines  2001 
Armenia 2016 Ecuador 1999 Philippines  2014 
Azerbaijan 1990 Ecuador 2001-2004 South Africa 1994 
Azerbaijan 1998-1999 Ecuador 2009-2010 South Africa 1999 
Azerbaijan 2004, 2008 India 1994,2000 South Africa 2002 
Azerbaijan 2010-2011 India 2003 South Africa 2006-2007 
Azerbaijan 2015 India 2006-2007 South Africa 2009-2010 
Belarus 2001-2002 India 2009 South Africa 2012 
Belarus 2006 India 2012-2013 Sri Lanka 1990 
Belarus 2009-2011 Indonesia 1990-1992 Sri Lanka 2000 
Belarus 2013-2014 Indonesia 1994-1995 Sri Lanka 2007 
Brazil 1993 Indonesia 1997-1998 Sri Lanka 2012-2014 
Brazil 1996-1998 Indonesia 2005 Sri Lanka 2016 
Brazil 2006-2008 Kazakhstan 1990,2000 Thailand 1990-1992 
Brazil 2011 Kazakhstan 2002-2007 Thailand 1994-1996 
Bulgaria 2003-2009 Malaysia 1990 Thailand 2006 
Bulgaria 2013 Malaysia 1992-1994 Thailand 2012 
China 1990 Malaysia 1997,2004 Tunisia 1990, 1999 
China 1998-1999 Malaysia 2012,2014 Tunisia 2001-2004 
China 2007 Mexico 1990 Tunisia 2006, 2008 
China 2011-2012 Mexico 1993 Ukraine 2003-2008 
China 2014, 2016 Mexico 1997-1999 Ukraine 2011, 2013 
Colombia 1990, 1993 Mexico 2004 Vietnam  1990 
Colombia 1995-1997 Mexico 2011,2013 Vietnam 2011-2016 



















Albania 1990-1993 China 2013-2014 Morocco 2013-2014 
Albania 2008, 2011, 
2013 
Colombia 1990 Morocco 2016 
Albania  Colombia 1992-1997 Nigeria  1990 
Algeria 1991 Colombia 2010 Nigeria  1992-1995 
Algeria 2003-2006 Costa Rica 1990,2005 Nigeria  1998 
Algeria 2010, 2014 Costa Rica 2007-2008 Nigeria  2002-2003 
Argentina 1990, 1995 Costa Rica 2011-2012 Paraguay 1990,2003 
Argentina 1997, 2003,  Costa Rica 2014-2015 Paraguay 2005-2010 
Argentina 20052008,  Dominican Rep. 1990,1993 Philippines 1993-1994 
Argentina 2011, 2015 Dominican Rep. 1995,2002 Philippines 2001,2010 
Armenia 2001-2003 Dominican Rep. 2006-2007 Philippines 2012,2014 
Armenia 2007 Dominican Rep. 2012,2014 South Africa 1994 
Armenia 2010-2011 Dominican Rep. 2014 South Africa 1999 
Armenia 2013 Ecuador 1991,1993 South Africa 2004 
Armenia 2016 Ecuador 1997 South Africa 2006-2007 
Azerbaijan 1990, 1998 Ecuador 2001-2002 South Africa 2010 
Azerbaijan 2000, 2004 Ecuador 2004 South Africa 2012 
Azerbaijan 2007 India 1994,2000 Sri Lanka 1990 
Azerbaijan 2010 India 2003 Sri Lanka 1994 
Azerbaijan 2015 India 2006-2007 Sri Lanka 1999 
Belarus 1996 India 2011-2013 Sri Lanka 2007-2009 
Belarus 2002 Indonesia 1990-1992 Sri Lanka 2012, 2014 
Belarus 2004 Indonesia 1994-1997 Thailand 1990-1991 
Belarus 2007 Indonesia 2004 Thailand 1993-1996 
Belarus 2009-2011 Kazakhstan 1990,2000 Thailand 2010,2012 
Belarus 2013 Kazakhstan 2002-2007 Tunisia 1990,1994, 
Brazil 1990 Malaysia 1990 Tunisia 1999 
Brazil 1993 Malaysia 1992-1993 Tunisia 2001-2002 
Brazil 1996-1998 Malaysia 1996-1997 Tunisia 2007-2008 
Brazil 2007 Malaysia 2007-2008 Tunisia 2012 
Brazil 2010-2011 Malaysia 2012 Ukraine 2001,2004 
Bulgaria 1996-1997 Mexico 1990-1991 Ukraine 2006-2008 
Bulgaria 2003-2008 Mexico 1993, 1999 Ukraine 2011,2013 
China 1990 Mexico 2010-2013 Vietnam 1990,1992 
China 2001 Morocco 1991 Vietnam 1995 






China 2010-2011 Morocco 1999, 2005 Vietnam 2014,2016 
































FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND MACROECONOMIC VOLATILITY: THE ROLE 
OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR BORROWING IN 
EMERGING MARKETS 
I. Introduction 
 One of the benefits of international financial integration, according to economic theory, is 
that it provides a better opportunity for countries to diversify their risk and smooth consumption 
growth amidst fluctuations in a country’s output growth. For individuals, firms, or countries to 
achieve risk diversification and improve their welfare gains, they need to protect their income 
(output) against various shocks in the economy or insure their consumption against shocks to their 
income (output). Insuring against country-wide shocks requires openness to financial flows that 
allows agents in different countries to pool their risks efficiently. 
 Empirical studies centered on financial integration and its impacts on international risk 
sharing suggest that while equity may promote risk sharing, particularly among industrialized 
countries, debt increases economic volatility  among emerging markets economies (EMEs) even 
during periods of increased globalization (O’Donnell (2001), Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad 
(2006), Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009)).  Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) argue that EMEs 
are less likely to benefit from international risk sharing since these economies rely largely on debt, 
which is more procyclical (increases in good times and decreases in bad times), than FDI and 






international borrowing/fiscal policy among most developing and emerging market economics 
tend to support the procyclicality of international government borrowing (Gavin and Perotti 
(1997), Catao and Sutton (2002) and Talvi and Vegh (2005)), the cyclical behavior of external 
debt differs depending on whether the borrower or lender is a public or private entity (Yeyati 
(2009), Araujo, David, Hombeeck and Papageorgiou  (2015)  and Galindo and Panizza (2018)). 
Yeyati (2009), Araujo, David, Hombeeck and Papageorgiou  (2015)  and Galindo and Panizza 
(2018) show that debt inflows to private borrowers (whether from a public or private lender) in 
emerging economies tend to be procyclical while debt inflows to public borrowers, particularly 
from public lenders, tends to be countercyclical. These authors argue both private international 
borrowing and private international  lending to the public sector in EMEs exhibit procyclical 
behavior because i) these countries lack access to international private credit especially during 
economic downturns or in periods of limited global capital flows ii) during bad times international 
private financiers are less likely to lend to countries that are not doing well are more likely to 
default during recessions. By contrast, they contend that public borrowing from international 
government lenders is countercyclical and does not depend on domestic or global conditions. This 
is because even in bad times, the public borrower (government) in emerging economy is still able 
to access credit from other sovereign nations or international organizations like the IMF or the 
World Bank.  International public lenders may also be more willing to assist a public borrower 
(sovereign nation) than a private investor in these same countries because public borrowers are 
seen as less risky than private borrowers. According to Galindo and Panizza (2018), the 







 This paper contributes to the literature by examining the behavior of public and private 
international debt inflows (delineated by both the borrower and lender) on international risk 
sharing in EMEs. This contribution is twofold. First, I focus on the borrower (debtor) and examine 
how international debt flows by public versus private borrowers affects output and consumption 
growth volatility. Second, I focus on the lender (creditor) and examine how international debt 
flows from public versus private lenders affects output and consumption growth volatility. By 
focusing on both borrower and lender heterogeneity I am able to investigate the differing 
cyclicalities in the different types of international debt. Examining financial integration, measured 
by international debt flows, uniquely on output and consumption volatility helps to unmasks 
effects that are averaged out by an aggregate approach. I focus on emerging economies as these 
economies provide the ideal setting to study how financial integration affects risk sharing 
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed:  In section II, I discuss the theoretical 
and empirical literature on how international capital flows (both equity and debt) affect 
consumption and output growth volatility. In section III, I discuss the decomposition of the types 
of external debt flows used in the study, examining both the borrower and lender. Section IV 
provides the methodology and data used in the study. Section V presents the results from the 
dynamic panel analysis. Section VI presents a decomposition of debt surges (extreme large debt 
increases) by the type of borrower and lender to see if larger episodes of debt flows behave 
differently than the flows examined in previous sections. I discuss the conclusion of the study in 
Section VI. 
II a. Theoretical Consideration  
 In theory, an economy with a perfect set of state-contingent markets (a full set of Arrow-






domestic consumption need not depend on domestic income shocks. That is, if international capital 
markets are perfect, the volatility of consumption growth across countries should be less than their 
corresponding volatility output growth as individuals are able to smooth consumption in the face 
of income shocks. In contrast to theory, however, in actual data the volatility of consumption 
growth is higher than output growth volatility (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)). The literature 
refers to this as the consumption correlation puzzle in that consumption is more highly correlated 
across countries than is output, indicating that risk sharing is not occurring to the extent expected.  
 There have been several theoretical attempts to explain why in the face of increasing 
international capital flows (financial integration) the relative volatility of consumption growth 
among EMEs continues to be high. Predictions proposed from theoretical models that focused on 
credit constraints and quality of the domestic financial market or domestic financial friction 
(Levchenko (2005), Leblebicioglu (2006), Evans and Hnatkovska (2007) and Zheng (2015)) 
suggest that financial integration increases consumption volatility relative to output volatility 
among developing and emerging economies. Levchenko (2005) for instance, adopted a Dynamic 
stochastic generalized equilibrium (DSGE) model subject to limited commitment and shows that 
countries with domestic frictions and uneven access to international markets reduce the amount of 
risk sharing and increase the volatility of consumption when they open up to international markets. 
Using a two-country real business cycle (RBC) model, Leblebicioglu (2006) showed how a 
borrowing constraint in the non-traded sector can lead to greater consumption volatility. Evans 
and Hnatkovska (2007) developed an RBC model that shows a hump-shaped relationship between 
consumption volatility and integration.  The relationship, however, is stronger at lower levels of 
financial integration or among less financially integrated countries. Zheng (2015) developed a 






raises business cycle and consumption volatility for countries with less developed financial 
markets. Generally, equity is associated with ex-ante risk sharing or diversification while debt is 
associated with ex-post consumption smoothing. A country that lends, whether in debt or equity, 
expects an interest payment and this certainty or reliability in returns gives an advantage for 
diversification and risk sharing.  On the other hand, when a country borrows internationally, the 
country is not only exposed to interest rate risk from foreign countries, but may also face exchange 
rate risk that changes the value of the debt over time if the debt is in a foreign currency (Blankenau, 
Kose and Yi (2001) and Fan, Mohtadi, and Neumann (2016)).  
II. b. Empirical Literature  
 While the theoretical literature tends to focus on the level of integration or domestic 
financial frictions on explaining the puzzle, existing empirical literature focusing on the impact of 
financial integration on macroeconomic volatility provides no clear link between financial 
openness and macroeconomic volatility, although it is suggestive that the type of economy matters. 
O’Donnell (2001) used data for 93 OECD and non-OECD countries to examine the impact of 
financial integration on output volatility.  The result suggests a decrease in output volatility among 
OECD countries with a high degree of financial integration but an increase in output volatility 
among non-OECD countries with a high degree of financial integration.  Bekaert, Harvey and 
Lundblad (2006) examine the effect of stock market liberalization and capital account openness 
on the volatility of output and consumption growth across a large cross-section of liberalized and 
segmented markets (mostly EMEs) from 1980-2000. Their investigation showed a significant 
decline in both output and consumption growth volatility following equity liberalization. Using a 
dataset for OECD countries over a 40year period, Buch, Doepke and Pierdzioch (2005) did not 






with an earlier study by Razin and Rose (1994), who find no consistent link between financial 
openness and consumption, investment and output volatility. Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2003) 
suggest that increasing financial openness is associated with rising consumption volatility (relative 
to output volatility), particularly for lower income countries. However, countries that are more 
financially integrated tend to experience a reduction in consumption volatility (relative to output 
volatility) in the face of financial integration. This is particularly true for advanced countries. [does 
this indicate a threshold of integration or income?] 
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) examine directly how financial integration affects risk 
sharing. They argued that the direction and types of capital flows (that is FDI, equity portfolio and 
debt) may have different effects on international risk sharing. In examining this, they regressed the 
gap between domestic consumption and world consumption on the gap between domestic output 
and world output. Their results show that FDI and equity may promote risk sharing, particularly 
for the industrialized countries during the globalization period, which suggests that the level of 
integration is positively related to the potential for risk sharing. They find that debt does not 
promote risk sharing among EMEs because of EMEs overdependence on debt.  Debt also tends to 
be more procyclical compared to equity, which has been considered by Fan, Mohtadi, and 
Neumann (2016) in a study that focuses on the risk sharing potential for different types of capital 
flows, delineated by both the direction and form of external financial capital flows.  
 Earlier studies by Yeyati (2009) and Galindo and Panizza (2018) show that international 
government borrowing from multilateral banks and other official lenders is countercyclical while 
government borrowing from private lenders is procyclical among developing and emerging 
countries. Thus, not only does the type of capital flow matter, but also the type of debt flow may 






smoothing or exacerbating cycles. Consequently, I focus on which type of international borrowing 
may promote international risk sharing.  Importantly, I consider both the type of debtor and the 
type of creditor, allowing me to examine external debt taken on by official and private debtors and 
external debt provided by official and private creditors. To answer this question, I decompose 
country-level external debt into private and public debt flows by debtors.  I further disaggregate 
public external debt flows into those provided by public or private sector lenders.  While I am 
unable to further subdivide private debt into that provided by public versus private creditors due 
to limited data, I am able to subdivide public debt into that provided by public versus private 
creditors. I then examine how each debt flow affects consumption and output growth volatility.  I 
expect external debt by a private borrower not to reduce economic volatility because of these two 
main reasons. First, private borrowers in EMEs lack access to international credit (credit 
constraint) during recession because credits (financial assistance) from international bodies like 
World Banks and IMF are reserved for sovereign nations. Secondly, private borrowers are less 
reluctant to even borrow from private lenders because of the high-stakes; private lenders do have 
their own interests and their own conditions, which might complicate any effort to negotiate easier 
terms for the borrowers, such as stretched-out payment schedules, lower interest rates or reduced 
principal. However, I expect external debt with a public component; public borrower from a public 
lender to reduce volatility and thus promote risk sharing. This is because even in bad times, the 
public borrower (compared to private borrower) in emerging economies is still able to access credit 
from other sovereign nations or international organizations like the IMF or World Banks with less 
complicated terms like stretched-out payment schedules, lower interest rate or reduced principal.  
International public lenders are more willing to assist a public borrower (sovereign nation).  






 In this section, I discuss in detail how to decompose external debt into private and public 
debt flows by both debtors and creditors.  
III.a. Decomposition of external debt flows by private and public debtors  
 To decompose total external debt flows into its private and public components. I follow 
Alfaro et al (2014), who define an appropriate measure of net private and public capital flows. 
They examined the correlation between net capital flows and growth and showed that such 
correlation can have different signs when capital flows are divided into public versus private 
components. Depending on which one dominates the other in a data sample determines the overall 
correlation sign between capital flows and growth. Figure 1 shows how the long-term external debt 
is decomposed into private non-guaranteed debt (PNGD) and public and publicly guaranteed long-
term debt (PPG) by a private and public borrower (debtor) respectively. IMF credits are considered 
public debt by a public borrower as they are only given to the government. Hence, I define external 
debt by a public borrower (debtor) as the sum of IMF credit and PPG debt and denote it as Total 
Public Debt (TPuD). One challenge with the decomposition of external debt I use is the difficulty 
to separate short-term debt into private an7d public components. Alfaro et al. (2014) assign short 
term flows to private flows. However, I consider them separately in this study and measure private 
borrowing in two ways. First, I define private borrowing as the Private Non-guaranteed Debt 
(PNGD).  Second, I define private borrowing as the sum of the Private Non-guaranteed Debt and 
the short-term external debt (similar to Alfaro et al.’s (2014) definition of private debt in their 
study) and denote this as Total Private Debt (TPvD)8.  In each case, I compare the responses to 
PNGD or TPvD flows to that of TPuD flows.  
 
7 External debt by a public debtor is any international debt borrowed or owed by the government or any government 
agencies within the domestic country (TPuD). 







III.b. Decomposing external debt flows by private and public creditors  
 Decomposing total external debt into those provided by private and public lenders is crucial 
in addressing the second question in this study, whether external public debt from public or private 
creditors reduces volatility.  
 Figure 1 from Alfaro, et al (2014) shows how the long-term external debt is decomposed 
into private non-guaranteed debt (PNGD) and public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt 
(PPG).  The PPG debt is further grouped into those provided by official and private status lenders. 
Credits from the IMF are considered official public debt as they are provided by a quasi-
government body, but the creditor of PPG debt could be either a public or private entity. I define 
external or foreign public debt by official creditors (OPD) as the sum of IMF credit and PPG debt 
from official creditors.  I define external public debt by private creditors (PPD) as the PPG debt 
from private creditors. In this study I refer to OPD as “Public” because they are provided by the 
public lenders and PPD as “Private” because they are provided by private lenders. PNDG debt has 
no information on the debt provider (lender) from the data source (World bank’s Global 
Development Finance database).  
 
IV. a. Empirical Methodology and Data 
 Using two dynamic panel models, I examine how Public debt flows and Private debt flows 
affect the volatility of consumption and output growth for 26 emerging market economies (EMEs) 
within the period of 1997-2016. 
 To examine how financial integration affects the volatility of both output and consumption 






𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛾1𝜎𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿1𝑍𝑖𝑡 + µ1𝑖 + 1,𝑖𝑡                            (1)  
𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼2 + 𝛾2𝜎𝐶𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑍𝑖𝑡 + µ2𝑖 + 2,𝑖𝑡                            (2)  
 Where 𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡  and 𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡  represent the output growth volatility and consumption growth 
volatility respectively, to country i at time t. 𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑡 denote the different types of debt variables, 
which can be considered as part of a set of financial integration variables. 𝑍𝑖𝑡  denotes the control 
variables, that consist of the natural logarithm of the population, Years of Schooling, Terms of 
trade, Trade Openness (percentage of GDP), KAOPEN (de jure measure of financial integration) 
and real GDP per capital growth. µ𝑖 is the country-specific fixed effects and 𝑖𝑡 denotes the error 
(idiosyncratic) term. Output (𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡  )and consumption (𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡) growth volatilities are measured by the 
5-year overlapping rolling window standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP per capita 
and the growth rate of real consumption per capita respectively.  
 There is the potential issue of endogeneity when modelling equations 1 and 2. The lagged 
dependent variables may be correlated with error terms in both equations. Second, the other 
independent variables are likely to be correlated with the errors (country fixed effects) or could 
themselves be explained by the dependent variable (output or consumption volatility). To address 
these issues, I estimate equations 1 and 2 using the system Generalized Methods of Moment 
(GMM) estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which helps to mitigate the potential 
endogeneity of a regressor by using lagged values of the independent variables as instruments. 
The debt flow measures as used in the model are the primary explanatory variables of 
interest and these can be considered de facto measures of financial integration.  Before I 
decompose the external debt into public and private components, I first use the net total external 
debt (NTED) as a measure of financial integration to examine if the result is consistent with 






by accumulated external debt liabilities. I then examine the different decompositions of debt, 
focusing first on the measures of external debt liabilities from public and private borrowers (Total 
Public Debt (TPuD) and Total Private Debt (TPvD)) and by public and private lenders (Official 
Public Debt (OPD) and Public Debt from Private Lenders (PPD)) . I also control for Financial 
integration (𝐹𝐼𝑖𝑡) using other de jure and de facto measures. For the measure of de jure financial 
openness, I use the KAOPEN index by Chinn and Ito (2008), which is based on the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangement and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). This index is 
normalized between zero and one where higher values of this index indicate that a country is more 
open to cross-border capital transactions. I include KAOPEN in all regressions as a control 
variable. The correlation between KAOPEN and the total external debt measure (NTED) is 0.151. 
Not including KAOPEN in the regressions does not change the qualitative results presented here. 
However, I prefer to keep that control variable in order to consider both the de jure and de facto 
aspects of international financial integration and their impacts on macroeconomic volatility 
(similar to Fan et al., (2016)).  
 Following the recent empirical literature on the drivers of macroeconomic volatility (Kose, 
et al.  (2003), Bekaert, et al. (2006) and Fan, et al (2016)), I identify relevant control variables. The 
set of control variables used in this study includes the natural logarithm of the population (which 
is a measure of economic size), Years of schooling (as a measure of the level of human capital) 
and the Terms of trade (expressed as the ratio of price of exportable good to price of importable 
good). Data for these variables are taken from the Penn World Table 9 (see Feenstra et al, (2015)). 
I also include the growth of real GDP per capita (which measures the level of economic 
performance or growth) and the ratio of Trade openness to GDP (sum of exports and imports 






possible control variables is long and ultimately, the inclusion of variables in the regressions is 
largely influenced by the existing literature and its relevance to this study, along with data 
availability for the countries in this study. All variable definitions and sources are given in Table 
2.11. 
IV. b. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2.1a provides descriptive statistics on the data used in this analysis for 26 countries 
from 1997 to 2016. The mean output growth volatility (𝜎𝑌)  is 4.12%, the average consumption 
growth volatility  (𝜎𝐶) is 3.72%, showing that consumption on average is less volatile than output 
in this sample.  Consumption growth volatility, however, shows greater variation than output 
growth volatility.  The de jure measure of financial integration, the KAOPEN index, has a mean 
value of 0.412 which implies that on average the financial markets of the countries considered in 
this study are modestly deregulated. Table 2.1b shows the descriptive statistics of the inflows and 
outflows for the various debt flow measures considered in this study, where the debt inflow 
(outflow) values are the positive (negative) net changes of external liabilities minus assets. The 
minimum and mean values of all four types of debt are positive indicating debt inflows on average 
for this set of countries. 
Table 2.1c provides a correlation analysis among the different types of debt flows measured by 
debtors and creditors as well as KAOPEN. The correlation table shows that in the case of debt 
flows by debtors, TPuD is negatively correlated to PNGD (-2.4%) and TPvD (-3.2%) while the 
correlation between the two measures of private debt flows (TPvD and PNGD) is strongly positive, 
about 83%. Also, for public debt flows by creditors, the correlation shows that OPD is negatively 






are negatively correlated regardless of whether the debt flows are measured by the debtor or 
creditor. KAOPEN shows a positive relationship with each of the debt flows, meaning higher 
financial integration (KAOPEN) is associated with higher debt inflows.  
V.  Results 
 This section provides regression estimates detailing how public and private debt flows by 
the debtor and from the creditor (financial integration) affect both output and consumption growth 
volatility.  
V.a.  By Debtor (Borrower) 
 Table 2.2 reports the estimated results for output and consumption volatility growth using 
a dynamic panel estimation of external debt liabilities by public and private borrowers. I discuss 
output and consumption growth volatility results separately in this section. 
V.a.1 Output Growth Volatility  
 Table 2.2 (cols. I-III) shows the results from Equation (1) using a system-GMM estimation 
of external debt liabilities by public and private borrowers on the volatility of output growth. In 
both cases, the result shows that the de jure measure of financial integration (KAOPEN) is 
insignificant. 
 In the case of de facto measures of financial integration, I first consider the net external 
debt inflow (NTED)9, I find that the coefficient on the NTED measure is positive and significant, 
which is consistent with previous studies by Buch, Doepke, and Pierdzioch (2005) and Fan, 
 
9 I considered both inflows and outflows NTED but found insignificant results for the outflows. Hence I focus on the 






Mohtadi, and Neumann (2016) that external debt is associated with greater output volatility. To 
examine this result further, it is necessary to decompose the measure of financial integration 
(NTED) into public and private debt (both by the debtors and creditors) and examine the effects 
on volatility. 
 First, I decompose the financial integration (NTED) into public external debt inflow 
(TPUD) and private external debt inflows (PNGD and TPvD) by the debtor. The result in Table 
2.2 shows that increases in external debt by the government (TPuD) is associated with lower output 
volatility growth while external debt by the private sector (measured as PNGD or TPvD) show an 
insignificant result.  This result is consistent with intuition and previous studies by Araujo, David, 
Hombeeck and Papageorgiou (2015) that external debt by public and private debtors have different 
cyclical behaviors and as such behave differently during good and bad times. 
V.a.2 Consumption Growth Volatility 
   Table 2.2 (cols [IV-VI]) shows that the coefficient of de jure financial integration, 
KAOPEN index, has no significant effect on consumption volatility growth among emerging 
markets.  
 The coefficient on aggregate external debt inflows (NTED) is positive and significant for 
consumption volatility, which implies aggregate debt inflows into EME’s do not allow for 
consumption risk sharing. This finding is consistent with previous studies (Kose, Prasad, and 
Terrones(2003), Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) and Fan, Mohtadi, and Neumann (2016)) that 
higher  external debt flows into emerging economies inhibits these countries from attaining the 
presumed risk sharing benefits of financial integration (thus, lower consumption volatility). Also, 






interest rate shocks as it continue to pay on its external debt or is exposed to interest rate risk from 
foreign countries via external borrowing, thus leading to higher consumption volatility 
(Blankenau, Kose and Yi (2001) and Fan, Mohtadi, and Neumann (2016)).  
 To examine the different cyclical behaviors of the types of debt, I disaggregate external 
debt liabilities into public and private debt flows by debtors. The coefficient on TPuD is negative 
and significant implying that higher international government borrowing lowers consumption 
volatility. The coefficients on PNGD and TPvD are insignificant, indicating little evidence of risk 
sharing on consumption. This finding is consistent with earlier argument discussed in section I, 
that international risk diversification can be driven by external government borrowing, which 
lowers consumption volatility because of the countercyclical nature of government borrowing 
(increases in bad times and decreases in good times). However, private borrowing does not reduce 
risk sharing because it tends to be more procyclical and increasing private external debts to 
emerging markets can prevent EMEs from utilizing these debts to smooth consumption volatilities.   
 The outcomes of both output volatility and consumption volatility show a common pattern. 
International public borrowing is associated with lower consumption and output volatility among 
EME’s. International private borrowing is not associated with lower consumption and output 
volatility, but it is also not associated with higher output or consumption volatility.  
V.b.  By Creditor (Lender) 
 I also consider creditors of external debt flows. My data allows me to decompose total 
public debt (TPuD) into debt from public creditors (OPD) and from private creditors (PPD). Table 
2.3 shows the dynamic panel estimation by the creditors of external government borrowing on 






V.b.1 Output Growth Volatility 
 I find that OPD has a negative and significant effect on output growth volatility, implying 
that increases in official public borrowing (sovereign to sovereign debt) lowers output volatility 
(risk) in EMEs (Table 2.3 col[I-III]). Galindo and Panizza (2018) argue that optimal official 
government borrowing should be countercyclical (increase in bad times and decrease in good 
times). My result shows a decrease in output volatility with greater official borrowing, indicating 
government borrowing can reduce output volatility.  Access to sovereign debt particularly during 
economic downturns helps EMEs to smooth their output or expenditure across good and bad times 
hence lowering the volatility (risk) in output growth. In the case of public debt from private 
creditors (PPD), the estimator for PPD is positive and significant. This implies that public debt 
from private lenders increases output volatility. 
V.b.2 Consumption Growth Volatility 
 For consumption volatility, Table 2.3 shows that the coefficient on OPD (debts from public 
lenders) is negative and significant. This finding indicates that a country’s consumption becomes 
less volatile when a country’s government borrows from public lenders, either other countries’ 
governments or government agencies like the IMF and World Bank. Previous studies (e.g., Yeyati 
(2009) and Galindo and Panizza (2018)) find that public lending to EMEs tends to be more 
countercyclical because these countries are more likely get access to credit from other sovereign 
nations or government agencies than from private entities especially during periods of economic 
downturns. The countercyclical nature of debts from public lenders (sovereign-to-sovereign debt) 
enables these countries to smooth their consumption across good and bad times (Kose, Prasad, and 






is insignificant, indicating that PPD has little to no influence on consumption growth volatility 
(PPD does not increase nor decrease consumption growth volatility). 
VI.  Debt Surges  
 From a policy perspective, it may be more meaningful and important to consider how 
surges in debt flows affect international risk sharing since these debt surges behave qualitatively 
different from the normal flows (Ghosh, Qureshi and Zalduendo (2014)). The result from my first 
chapter (Surges of private and public debt flows in emerging economies) showed that there are 
indeed differences in the responsiveness of debt flows to various push and pull factors at different 
points along the debt flow distribution.  Surges in  debt flows behave qualitatively differently from 
normal flows  and as such merit a separate treatment or analysis. Surges may also matter to 
policymakers because they bring the potential of sudden reversals of that debt inflow or an increase 
in interest on accumulated debt. 
 In this section, I examine how debt surges (large increases) affect the volatility of output 
growth and consumption growth in EME’s, using the same debt delineations as in Section III (debt 
flows in levels) to characterize the debt surges. My concept of surge is that it should capture 
instance of an exceptionally large level of debt flows (both private and public) into the country. I 
define public and private surges following Ghosh, Qureshi and Zalduendo (2014) as the external 
debt flows that lie within the top 30th percentile of both the country’s sample distribution and the 
entire countries’  sample distribution.10 I define surges  in all the debt types discussed above. The 
reason for identifying debt surges based on the country’s sample distribution as well as the entire 
 
10 Ghosh et al (2014) also consider a surge identification using observations that lie within the top 30th percentile of 
the country’s sample distribution.  Results using either definition for the threshold are similar and I only present 






countries’ sample distribution is to ensure that surges are not only “large” by the country's own 
experience but also by cross-country standards See Osei-Sarfo (2020) for further discussion of 
private and public debt surges and thresholds for definitions of such surges.   
  I have 156 observations of surges for each of the debt surge measures (TPvD surge, PNVD 
surge, TPuD surge, OPD surge and PPD surge). About 364 observations in the estimated samples 
are zero. Though it is surprising or striking that the different debt surges seem to have the same 
number of observations, the surges occur in different year periods for different debt types.  
Tables 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 list the countries defined as having a surge in private (TPvD and 
PNGD) and public (TPuD) debt by the debtors. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 list the countries defined as 
having a public debt surge from private (PPD) and public (OPD) lenders.  As an example, focusing 
on Albania in Table 2.6, there is a surge in 2003 and 2005 for total private debt for Albania. This 
means that a surge occurred (S=1) in year 2003 and 2005 for Albania for total private debt but no 
surge occurred (S=0) in 2004. 
 
VII. a. Debt Surges by Public vs Private Debtors  
 To examine the effect of debt inflow surges on economic volatility by the type of borrower, 
I decompose the debt surge into public and private borrower and examine whether the results differ 
across the type of borrowers.  I also consider whether surges in these debts affect economic 
volatility differently from debt in levels. 






 Table 2.4 reports the results of public and private debt surges by the borrower on output 
growth volatility.  The de jure measure of financial integration, KAOPEN, is insignificant for both 
output growth volatility and consumption growth volatility.  
  Turning to the de facto measure of financial integration as measured by debt surges, I 
consider surges in  total public debt (TPuD), private debt (excluding short-term debt, PNDG) and 
total private debt (including the short-term debt, TPvD); these are all debts by the debtor. The 
results show that the estimators for PNDG and TPvD surges are insignificant for output volatility 
while the estimator for TPuD surges is negative and significant for output volatility. Overall, the 
results imply that debt by private debtors has little influence on output volatility but increases 
consumption volatility when debt surges include short term debt. TPvD levels did not increase 
consumption volatility but surges in TPvD flows do, indicating that surges in short-term private 
debt may be particularly associated with increased volatility. In the case of total public debt 
(TPuD), although the size of the coefficient on TPuD surges is smaller than TPuD levels, the 
coefficient is still negative and significant for both output and consumption growth volatility. This 
negative and significant result on the coefficient of TPuD is not surprising because an increase in 
international government borrowing is expected to be associated with lower economic volatility 
(both output and consumption volatility). The findings support the empirical evidence that the 
benefit of international risk diversification and risk sharing is determined by international 
government borrowing that helps to stabilize output volatility and consumption volatility (Yeyati 






TPvD surges are positive and significant for consumption volatility while PNDG is 
insignificant for consumption volatility. This implies that higher level of private debt surge when 
the private debt measure includes short-term debt is associated with higher consumption volatility 
VII. b: Public Debt Surges by Public vs Private Creditors. 
I also examine how public debt inflow surges by both public and private creditor distinctively 
affect the output and consumption volatility. I begin by decomposing the public debt surge into 
public and private creditors and examine each on both output and consumption volatility. 
VII. b.1. Results: Output and Consumption Growth Volatility  
 Results reported in Table 2.5 show that surges in international government borrowing from 
official lenders (OPD) lowers both consumption and output volatility, hence promoting 
international sharing risking among EME’s. However, in the case of surges in international 
government borrowing from private lenders (PPD) the result is different. I find a strong positive 
association between surges in external public debt from private lenders (PPD) and output volatility 
but an insignificant association between surges in PPD and consumption volatility. That is, higher 
inflows of public debt surges from private lenders increases output volatility among EME’s. In the 
case of consumption volatility, the result shows that surges in external public debts from private 
lenders (PPD) has little to no influence on consumption volatility. The result for OPD levels and 
OPD surges shows a similar pattern– both reduced output volatility and consumption volatility. 
Also, PPD levels and PPD surges result are similar– both increased output volatility but have no 








 In this paper, I examine how different types of international debt affect international risk 
sharing, with emphasis on how external debt delineated by the type of debtor and by the type of 
creditor distinctively affect output and consumption growth volatility among EMEs. Previous 
empirical studies show that equity promotes risk sharing in emerging economies, but that debt 
does not because these countries rely on debts that tend to be more procyclical. The evidence in 
this study reveals that external debt (both in levels and surges) with a public component – external 
debt from either public borrowers or public lenders – reduces both output and consumption 
volatility among EMEs. This is particularly true because of the countercyclical nature of this debt 
which helps emerging economies to smooth their output in both good and bad times by saving 
during booms and borrowing during economic downturns. However, external debt by a private 
borrower tends to have insignificant effects on economic volatility. By contrast, public debt from 
private lenders tends to increase output volatility significantly but have no effect on consumption 
volatility. The latter result is not surprising as both public and private borrowers in EME’s 
especially, are mostly unable to access international credit during recessions from private lenders. 
This is because the stakes are high with borrowing from private lenders; private lenders do have 
their own interests and their own conditions, which might complicate any effort to negotiate easier 
terms for the borrowers, such as stretched-out payment schedules, lower interest rates or reduced 
principal. For private borrowers, they mostly face a tougher situation as international private 
financiers are sometimes reluctant to extend credit to private investors in EMEs during recession 
and they cannot access credit from international public lenders like the IMF and World Bank. All 
these challenges and more in accessing international credit inhibit EME’s from smoothing their 






that to promote risk sharing via debt flows among EME’s, policymakers in these countries should 
focus on sovereign-to-sovereign debt flows (government debt from official creditors) as the result 
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 Table 2.1a Summary statistics calculated across all countries and time  




volatility (in %) 




520 3.720 4.046 0.098 32.993 
LnPop 
 
520 3.624 1.662 0.143 7.247 
Years of School 
(YoS) 
520 2.385 0.406 1.384 3.214 
Trade Openness 520 72.353 37.856 16.439 220.407 
KAOPEN 520 0.412 0.273 0 1 
Terms of Trade 
(ToT) 
512 1.084 0.126 0.735 1.585 
Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
520 0.030 0.036 -0.155 0.265 
NETD/GDP 520 1.491 5.374 -21.560 57.599 
Note: NETD is net external total debt (sum of short-term debt, long-term debt and IMF credit) 
Table 2.1b. Summary statistics for the different external debt flows into inflows and outflows  
 Observation  Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Inflows      
NTED/GDP 343 3.194 5.616 0.005 57.599 
PNGD/GDP 333 2.060 4.185 0.002 55.608 
TPvD/GDP 348 3.021 1.473 0.117 57.603 
TPuD/GDP 340 2.111 2.092 0.002 18.479 
PPD/GDP 281 1.394 1.445 0 12.138 
OPD/GDP 321 1.403 5.348 0.001 21.366 
      
Outflows      
NTED/GDP 177 -1.811 2.691 -21.564 0 
PNGD/GDP 187 -0.972 1.650 -14.371 0 
TPvD/GDP 172 -1.841 2.678 -21.484 0 
TPuD/GDP 180 -1.952 3.462 -28.668 0 
PPD/GDP 239 -0.887 1.875 -21.380 0 
OPD/GDP 199 -1.337 2.842 -26.233 0 
Note: NETD is net external total debt (sum of short-term debt, long-term debt and IMF credit),PNGD is private non-
guaranteed debt, TPvD is total private debt (sum of private non-guaranteed debt and short-term debt), OPD is official 
public debt, PPD is public debt from private creditors and TPuD is total public debt (sum of official public debt and 








Correlation Matrix among Public and Private debt flow measures and KAOPEN 
 TPuD/GDP TPvD/GDP PNGD/GDP  OPD/GDP PPD/GDP KAOPEN 
TPuD/GDP  1.000      
TPvD/GDP  -0.032 1.000     
PNGD/GDP  -0.024 0.828 1.000    
OPD/GDP  0.791 0.022 0.051 1.00   
PPD/GDP  0.568 -0.082 -0.076 -0.53 1.00  
KAOPEN 0.074 0.153 0.162 0.036 0.072 1.00 
Note: TPuD is total public debt (sum of official public debt and public debt from private creditors), TPvD is total 
private debt (sum of private non-guaranteed debt and short-term debt), PNGD is private non-guaranteed debt, OPD is 
official public debt (sum of IMF Credits and Public and Publicly guaranteed debt from public creditors) , PPD is 





























Output Volatility Growth (𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
 
Consumption Volatility Growth 
(𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
 





































































































  0.318** 
(0.130) 
  








PNGD/GDP  0.061 
(0.142) 
  0.112 
(0.248) 
 
TPvD/GDP   -0.004 
(0.085) 
  0.108 
(0.108) 
Observation 487 425 425 487 425 425 
AR (2) test P-
value  
0.120 0.924 0.889 0.129 0.242 0.989 
Hansen test P-
value  
0.414 0.245 0.531 0.322 0.847 0.235 
Note: Statistics reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively. NETD is net external total debt (sum of short-term debt, long-term debt and IMF credit), TPuD 
is total public debt (sum of official public debt and public debt from private creditors), PNGD is private non-
guaranteed debt and TPvD is total private debt (sum of private non-guaranteed debt and short-term debt). All these 






Table 2.3.  Effect of public external debt from Private and Public sources on Output and 
Consumption Volatility 
Note: Statistics reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. OPD is official public debt (sum of IMF Credits and Public and Publicly guaranteed debt from public creditors) and 










Output Volatility Growth (𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
 
Consumption Volatility Growth (𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
 























































































































Observation 390 310 258 390 310 258 
AR (2) test P-
value  
0.523 0.900 0.201 0.889 0.974 0.166 
Hansen test 
P-value  







Table 2.4. Effect of debt Surges to Private and Public debt borrowers on Output and 
Consumption Volatility 
Note: Statistics reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. TPuD is total public debt (sum of official public debt and public debt from private creditors), PNGD is private non-
guaranteed debt and TPvD is total private debt (sum of private non-guaranteed debt and short-term debt). All these debts are net 










Output Volatility Growth (𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
 
Consumption Volatility Growth (𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
 

























































































Observation 247 247 247 247 
AR (2) test P-
value  
0.810 0.814 0.379 0.989 
Hansen test P-
value  







Table 2.5. Effect of public debt Surges from Private and Public debt lenders on Output and 
Consumption Volatility 
Note: Statistics reported in parentheses are robust standard errors.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5, and  
10% levels, respectively. OPD is official public debt (sum of IMF Credits and Public and Publicly guaranteed debt 
from public creditors) and PPD is Public and Publicly guaranteed debt from private creditors. All these debts are net 










Output Volatility Growth (𝜎𝑌𝑖𝑡) 
 
Consumption Volatility Growth 
(𝜎𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
 














































Observation 250 250 











       Table 2.6. List of surges of Total Private Debt/GDP (TPvD/GDP)  
Country TPvD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Country TPvD/GDP_ Surge 
Duration 
Albania 2003 Malaysia 2007-2012 
Albania 2005 Malaysia 2014,2016 
Albania 2007-2008 Mauritius  2009-2014 
Albania 2010-2013 Mauritius 2016 
Argentina  1997 Mexico 2010-2013 
Argentina  2003, 2005, 2008 Morocco 1997 
Argentina  2011, 20132015 Morocco 1999 
Brazil 1997-1998 Morocco 2013-2014 
Brazil 2007 Morocco 2016 
Brazil 2010-2011 Nigeria 1998 
Bulgaria 1997 Nigeria 2002-2004 
Bulgaria 2000 Pakistan 2010 
Bulgaria 2002-2009 Paraguay 1998 
Bulgaria 2012-2013 Paraguay 2002-2010 
China 2001 Paraguay 2012 
China 2010-2011 Philippines 1997 
Colombia 1997 Philippines 2001 
Colombia 2010-2011 Philippines 2010 
Colombia 2016 Philippines 2012 
Costa Rica 2002 Philippines 2014 
Costa Rica 2004-2005 Romania 2000-2008 
Costa Rica 2007-2008 South Africa 2002 
Costa Rica 2011-2012 South Africa 2004 
Costa Rica 2014-2016 South Africa 2006-2007 
Dominican Rep. 2002 South Africa 2010 
Dominican Rep. 2006-2007 South Africa 2012 
Dominican Rep. 2012 Sri Lanka 1999 
Dominican Rep. 2014 Sri Lanka 2007-2009 
Ecuador 2001-2002 Sri Lanka 2011-2014 
Ecuador 2004 Thailand 2006 
India 2003 Thailand 2009-2010 
India 2006-2007 Thailand 2012 
India 2011 Tunisia 1999 
India 2013 Tunisia 2001-2002 
Indonesia 1997 Tunisia 2007-2008 
Indonesia 2004 Tunisia 2012 
Indonesia 2007 Vietnam 2004, 2007 
Malaysia 1997 Vietnam 2010-2011 
Malaysia 2004-2005 Vietnam 2014-2016 






       Table 2.7. List of surges of Private Non-Guaranteed Debt/GDP (PNGD/GDP)  




Albania 2005 Malaysia 2012-2014 
Albania 2008-2013 Malaysia 2016 
Argentina  1997-1998 Mauritius 2011 
Argentina  2001 Mauritius 2013-2014 
Argentina  2005 Mauritius 2016 
Argentina  2007-2008 Mexico 1997-1999 
Brazil  1997 Mexico 2011 
Brazil 2006-2008 Mexico 2013 
Brazil 2010-2012 Morocco 1999 
Bulgaria 1999 Morocco 2003 
Bulgaria 2002-2009 Morocco 2013 
Bulgaria 2012-2013 Morocco 2015 
China 1998 Nigeria 2000-2001 
China 2014 Nigeria 2005 
Colombia 1997 Nigeria 2007 
Colombia 2003 Pakistan 2008 
Colombia 2007 Paraguay  2002-2010 
Colombia 2010-2011 Paraguay 2012 
Colombia 2013 Philippines 1997-1998 
Colombia 2016 Philippines 2001 
Costa Rica 2004-2005 Philippines 2014-2016 
Costa Rica 2009 Romania 1997-1998 
Costa Rica 2011-2016 Romania 2000-2009 
Dominican Rep. 2006-2007 Romania 2012-2013 
Dominican Rep. 2012 South Africa 1999 
Ecuador 1999 South Africa 2001-2002 
Ecuador 2002-2004 South Africa 2006-2007 
India 2000 South Africa 2009-2012 
India 2003 South Africa 2016 
India 2006-2007 Sri Lanka 2012-2014 
India 2013 Thailand 2002-2004 
Indonesia 1997-1998 Thailand 2006 
Indonesia 2004-2005 Thailand 2012 
Indonesia 2009 Thailand 2014 
Indonesia 2011 Tunisia 1999 
Indonesia 2013-2014 Tunisia 2001-2002 
Malaysia 1997 Tunisia 2010 
Malaysia 1999-2000 Vietnam 2012 
Malaysia 2004-2005 Vietnam 2014-2016 






 Table 2.8. List of surges of Total Public Debt/GDP (TPuD/GDP)  
Country TPuD/GDP _ 
Surge Duration 
Country TPuD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Albania 1998-2000 Mexico 2010 
Albania 2003-2004 Mexico 2012-2014 
Albania 2006-2010 Morocco 2007 
Argentina 1998-1999 Morocco 2009-2010 
Argentina 2001-2004 Morocco 2012-2013 
Argentina 2007 Nigeria 1998 
Argentina 2009 Nigeria 2000 
Argentina 2016 Nigeria 2003 
Brazil 1998 Pakistan 1998-1999 
Brazil 2002 Pakistan 2002-2003 
Bulgaria 1998-1999 Pakistan 2006-2009 
Bulgaria 2003 Paraguay 1999 
Bulgaria 2012 Paraguay 2003-2004 
Bulgaria 2014-2016 Paraguay 2014 
Colombia 1999 Paraguay 2016 
Colombia 2003 Philippines 1998-1999 
Colombia 2009 Philippines 2002-2003 
Colombia 2013-2015 Philippines 2009 
Costa Rica 1998 Romania 1997 
Costa Rica 2000 Romania 2000 
Costa Rica 2003 Romania 2002-2004 
Costa Rica 2012-2015 Romania 2009-2011 
Dominican Rep. 2001-2004 South Africa 1997 
Dominican Rep. 2009-2013 South Africa 2002 
Dominican Rep. 2016 South Africa 2009-2010 
Ecuador 1999 South Africa 2012 
Ecuador 2010 Sri Lanka 1998-1999 
Ecuador 2013-2016 Sri Lanka 2002-2004 
Indonesia 1998-1999 Sri Lanka 2006-2007 
Indonesia 2003, 2009 Sri Lanka 2009-2013 
Indonesia 2012 Sri Lanka 2016 
Indonesia 2015-2016 Thailand 1997-1999 
Malaysia 1998 Tunisia 2002-2004 
Malaysia 2001-2004 Tunisia 2007, 2009 
Malaysia 2006 Tunisia 2012 
Malaysia 2008-2010 Tunisia 2015-2016 
Malaysia 2012 Vietnam 1998-1999 
Mauritius 2009-2010 Vietnam 2002-2004 
Mauritius 2013 Vietnam 2007-2013 






 Table 2.9. List of surges of Public Debt/GDP by Private Lenders (PPD/GDP)  
Country PPD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Country PPD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Albania 2008-2010 Mexico 2003 
Argentina 1997-1999 Mexico 2007 
Argentina 2002-2004 Mexico 2010-2015 
Argentina 2006-2007 Morocco 2010 
Argentina 2009 Morocco 2012-2014 
Argentina 2016 Pakistan 1997 
Brazil 2012-2014 Pakistan 2014 
Bulgaria 2012 Pakistan 2016 
Bulgaria 2014-2016 Paraguay 1999 
China 1997 Paraguay 2013-2016 
Colombia 1997-1999 Philippines 1997-2000 
Colombia 2007 Philippines 2002-2003 
Colombia 2009 Philippines 2005-2006 
Colombia 2013-2015 Philippines 2009-2010 
Costa Rica 1998-2001 Romania 1997 
Costa Rica 2003 Romania 2000-2004 
Costa Rica 2007 Romania 2011-2014 
Costa Rica 2012-2015 South Africa 1997 
Dominican Republic 2001-2004 South Africa 2002-2003 
Dominican Republic 2011 South Africa 2005 
Dominican Republic 2013-2016 South Africa 2009-2012 
Ecuador 1997 South Africa 2016 
Ecuador 2005 Sri Lanka 1997-1998 
Ecuador 2014-2016 Sri Lanka 2007 
India 1997-1998 Sri Lanka 2009-2013 
India 2012 Sri Lanka 2015-2016 
India 2014 Thailand 1998 
Indonesia 1998 Thailand 2010-2012 
Indonesia 2005 Tunisia 1997 
Indonesia 2009 Tunisia 1999 
Indonesia 2012 Tunisia 2002-2004 
Indonesia 2014-2016 Tunisia 2012 
Malaysia 1997-1998 Tunisia 2015-2016 
Malaysia 2001-2010 Vietnam 1997 
Malaysia 2012 Vietnam 2005 
Mauritius 1997 Vietnam 2010 
Mauritius 1999 Vietnam 2013 
Mauritius 2003   
Mexico 2001   






     Table 2.10. List of surges of Public Debt/GDP from Public (Official) Lenders  
      (OPD/GDP)  
Country OPD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Country OPD/GDP _ Surge 
Duration 
Albania 1998-2001 Mexico 2009 
Albania 2003-2004 Morocco 2006-2009 
Albania 2006-2009 Morocco 2011-2013 
Albania 2011-2014 Nigeria 1998 
Albania 2016 Nigeria 2000 
Algeria 1998 Nigeria 2003-2004 
Algeria 2009 Nigeria 2009 
Argentina  2001 Pakistan 1998-1999 
Argentina  2003 Pakistan 2002-2003 
Argentina  2009 Pakistan 2006-2010 
Argentina  2014 Paraguay 1998-1999 
Brazil 1998-1999 Paraguay 2002-2004 
Brazil 2001-2003 Paraguay 2009 
Bulgaria  1998-1999 Paraguay 2016 
Bulgaria 2002-2004 Philippines 1998-1999 
Colombia 1999 Philippines 2002-2003 
Colombia 2001 Philippines 2008-2009 
Colombia 2003 Romania 2000 
Colombia 2009 Romania 2002-2003 
Colombia 2012 Romania 2009-2011 
Costa Rica 2003 South Africa 2009 
Costa Rica 2009-2010 Sri Lanka 1998-1999 
Costa Rica 2016 Sri Lanka 2002-2004 
Dominican Rep. 2003-2006 Sri Lanka 2006-2012 
Dominican Rep. 2009-2013 Thailand 1997-1999 
Ecuador 1998-2000 Tunisia 2002-2004 
Ecuador 2002-2003 Tunisia 2006-2007 
Ecuador 2007 Tunisia 2009 
Ecuador 2010-2011 Tunisia 2011-2013 
Ecuador 2013 Tunisia 2016 
Ecuador 2015-2016 Vietnam 1998-1999 
India 1999 Vietnam 2001-2004 
Indonesia 1998-1999 Vietnam 2007-2013 
Indonesia 2002-2003 Vietnam 2015-2016 
Indonesia 2008   
Malaysia 2001   
Mauritius 2002   
Mauritius 2009-2013   







      Table 2.11 
      Data sources 
Variables  Source 
KAOPEN The Chinn-Ito Index (2008 updated version)  
(Chinn and Ito, 2008)  
 
Private Non-Guaranteed Debt (PNGD) 
Total Private Debt (TPvD) 
Total Public Debt (TPuD), 
Official Public Debt (OPD) 
Public Debt from Private Creditor (PPD) 
International Debt Statistics (IDS) of the World 
Bank’s Global Development Finance (GDF) 
Real GDP per capita; Real Consumption 
per capita; Population; Year of 
schooling; Terms of Trade  
 
Penn World Table 9.1 
Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015) 
 Trade Openness to GDP, Real GDP per 
capita Growth 
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